Andrea Karoly

• This thesis develops an equilibrium framework for strategic exercise of geographical market entry option. The theoretical model analyses the impact of asymmetries of the competing firms such as follower entry barrier and asymmetric profitability on the optimal market entry timing and firm values. The duopoly model shows the existence of three types of equilibrium strategies and expresses the critical level of asymmetry which separates the equilibrium regions. The analysis proves that the softer competition does not force the stronger firm to enter the market at his preemption point and as a consequence the rent equalisation between the firms does not occur. However, it is also shown that the critical level of asymmetry is mitigated or strengthened by common economic factors such as the host market profit volatility and the interest rate. Extending the duopoly model to the oligopoly case the results present that each additional competitor delays the first market entrance compared to the duopolist leader preemption point. Hence, oneThis thesis develops an equilibrium framework for strategic exercise of geographical market entry option. The theoretical model analyses the impact of asymmetries of the competing firms such as follower entry barrier and asymmetric profitability on the optimal market entry timing and firm values. The duopoly model shows the existence of three types of equilibrium strategies and expresses the critical level of asymmetry which separates the equilibrium regions. The analysis proves that the softer competition does not force the stronger firm to enter the market at his preemption point and as a consequence the rent equalisation between the firms does not occur. However, it is also shown that the critical level of asymmetry is mitigated or strengthened by common economic factors such as the host market profit volatility and the interest rate. Extending the duopoly model to the oligopoly case the results present that each additional competitor delays the first market entrance compared to the duopolist leader preemption point. Hence, one additional competitor accelerates the first market entry if the number of competing firms excluding him is odd and has the reverse impact if it is even. It is further observed that continuation may disappear in some subgames of the market entry game in an oligopoly as a result of which no closed loop market entry strategy set exists. The equilibrium results of the theoretical models are tested empirically by applying the Cox proportional hazard model on entry behaviour of 61 retailers into 6 Eastern European countries from 1989 until 2005. The results explain why retailers entered certain markets earlier and why some firms succeeded more in seizing the entry opportunity. The results show that driven by the development of demand potential on the host market and by the intensity of competition, foreign retailers had a limited period of time - defined as the “window of opportunity” - to carry out their market entry.…