Optimizing Toll Enforcement in Transportation Networks: a Game-Theoretic Approach
Please always quote using this URN: urn:nbn:de:0297-zib-17401
- We present a game-theoretic approach to optimize the strategies of toll enforcement on a motorway network. In contrast to previous approaches, we consider a network with an arbitrary topology, and we handle the fact that users may choose their Origin-Destination path; in particular they may take a detour to avoid sections with a high control rate. We show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed with an LP (although the game is not zero-sum), and we give a MIP for the computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium. Experimental results based on an application to the enforcement of a truck toll on German motorways are presented.
Author: | Ralf BorndörferORCiD, Julia Buwaya, Guillaume Sagnol, Elmar Swarat |
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Document Type: | ZIB-Report |
Tag: | Game Theory; Mixed Integer Programming; Stackelberg Equilibrium |
MSC-Classification: | 91-XX GAME THEORY, ECONOMICS, SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES |
CCS-Classification: | I. Computing Methodologies |
Date of first Publication: | 2012/12/19 |
Series (Serial Number): | ZIB-Report (12-47) |
ISSN: | 1438-0064 |
Published in: | Appeared in: Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics Volume 41, 5 June 2013, Pages 253–260 |
DOI: | https://doi.org//10.1016/j.endm.2013.05.100 |