Selecting Investment Arbitrators

  • This paper focuses on one particular issue which has arisen in the course of the ongoing debate on the reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), namely that of the appointment of arbitrators. Taking as its starting point that there now exists tentative consensus that the present system for the appointment of arbitrators either causes or exacerbates certain problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, the paper explores one option for reform, namely the introduction of an independent panel for the selection of investment arbitrators. In doing so, it is argued that a shift in the normative basis of the rules governing appointments is required in order to accommodate the principles of party autonomy and the international rule of law. Such reform, while not completely removing the initiative that parties presently enjoy, is the most efficient way to introduce rule of law considerations such as a measure of judicial independence into the current appointments system. This, it is argued, would in turn help to address some of theThis paper focuses on one particular issue which has arisen in the course of the ongoing debate on the reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS), namely that of the appointment of arbitrators. Taking as its starting point that there now exists tentative consensus that the present system for the appointment of arbitrators either causes or exacerbates certain problematic aspects of the current ISDS system, the paper explores one option for reform, namely the introduction of an independent panel for the selection of investment arbitrators. In doing so, it is argued that a shift in the normative basis of the rules governing appointments is required in order to accommodate the principles of party autonomy and the international rule of law. Such reform, while not completely removing the initiative that parties presently enjoy, is the most efficient way to introduce rule of law considerations such as a measure of judicial independence into the current appointments system. This, it is argued, would in turn help to address some of the problematic features of the appointment of arbitrators in ISDS.show moreshow less

Download full text files

  • kfg_wp33.pdfeng
    (1592KB)

    SHA-1: 4405b0b4f82fe3ffae4658cbdde67b04dc5bdbbe

Export metadata

Additional Services

Search Google Scholar Statistics
Metadaten
Author details:James Gerard DevaneyGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-435797
DOI:https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-43579
Title of parent work (English):KFG Working Paper Series
Subtitle (English):Reconciling Party Autonomy and the International Rule of Law
Publication series (Volume number):KFG Working Paper Series (33)
Publication type:Working Paper
Language:English
Date of first publication:2019/06/04
Publication year:2019
Publishing institution:Universität Potsdam
Release date:2019/10/24
Issue:33
Number of pages:27
Source:First publication of the paper: SSRN https://ssrn.com/abstract=3388903
RVK - Regensburg classification:PR 2200, PR 2353
Organizational units:Extern / Berlin Potsdam Research Group "The International Rule of Law - Rise or Decline?"
DDC classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 34 Recht
Peer review:Nicht referiert
License (German):License LogoKeine öffentliche Lizenz: Unter Urheberrechtsschutz
Accept ✔
This website uses technically necessary session cookies. By continuing to use the website, you agree to this. You can find our privacy policy here.