Strategic ignorance in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments and its effects on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation

  • Being ignorant of key aspects of a strategic interaction can represent an advantage rather than a handicap. We study one particular context in which ignorance can be beneficial: iterated strategic interactions in which voluntary cooperation may be sustained into the final round if players voluntarily forego knowledge about the time horizon. We experimentally examine this option to remain ignorant about the time horizon in a finitely repeated two-person prisoners’ dilemma game. We confirm that pairs without horizon knowledge avoid the drop in cooperation that otherwise occurs toward the end of the game. However, this effect is superposed by cooperation declining more rapidly in pairs without horizon knowledge during the middle phase of the game, especially if players do not know that the other player also wanted to remain ignorant of the time horizon.

Download full text files

  • cepa10.pdfeng
    (1268KB)

    SHA-1:d2bc74dc4181810012849443d5515ddb405f8a1b

Export metadata

Metadaten
Author details:Lisa Verena BruttelORCiDGND, Simon Felgendreher, Werner GüthORCiDGND, Ralph HertwigORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:kobv:517-opus4-431881
DOI:https://doi.org/10.25932/publishup-43188
ISSN:2628-653X
Title of parent work (English):CEPA Discussion Papers
Publication series (Volume number):CEPA Discussion Papers (10)
Publication type:Working Paper
Language:English
Date of first publication:2019/08/05
Publication year:2019
Publishing institution:Universität Potsdam
Release date:2019/08/05
Tag:cooperation; experiment; prisoners' dilemma; strategic ignorance
Issue:10
Number of pages:30
RVK - Regensburg classification:QC 020, QC 010
Organizational units:Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät / Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Zentrale und wissenschaftliche Einrichtungen / Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CEPA)
DDC classification:1 Philosophie und Psychologie / 15 Psychologie / 150 Psychologie
3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
JEL classification:C Mathematical and Quantitative Methods / C9 Design of Experiments / C91 Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D Microeconomics / D8 Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty / D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
D Microeconomics / D8 Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty / D89 Other
Peer review:Nicht referiert
License (German):License LogoKeine öffentliche Lizenz: Unter Urheberrechtsschutz
Accept ✔
This website uses technically necessary session cookies. By continuing to use the website, you agree to this. You can find our privacy policy here.