The credibility of central bank announcements
- In this paper, we present a monetary policy game in which the central bank has a private forecast of supply and demand shocks. The public needs to form its inflationary expectations and can make use of central bank announcements. However, because of the credibility problem that the central bank faces, the public will not believe a precise announcement. By extending the arrangement proposed by Garfinkel and Oh (1995) to a model that includes private information about both demand and supply shocks, we investigate the feasibility of making imprecise credible announcements concerning the rate of inflation. Klassifikation:E52;E58
| Author: | Marco Hoeberichts |
|---|---|
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-9992 |
| Parent Title (German): | Center for Financial Studies (Frankfurt am Main): CFS working paper series ; No. 2002,09 |
| Series (Serial Number): | CFS working paper series (2002, 09) |
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Year of Completion: | 2002 |
| Year of first Publication: | 2002 |
| Publishing Institution: | Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg |
| Release Date: | 2005/06/13 |
| Tag: | announcements; monetary policy; private information |
| GND Keyword: | Geldpolitik; Glaubwürdigkeit; Asymmetrische Information |
| Issue: | August 2002 |
| Page Number: | 22 |
| Source: | CFS working paper ; 2002,09 |
| HeBIS-PPN: | 201785544 |
| Institutes: | Wissenschaftliche Zentren und koordinierte Programme / Center for Financial Studies (CFS) |
| Dewey Decimal Classification: | 3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft |
| Licence (German): |  Deutsches Urheberrecht |
