Essays in Microeconomic Theory
Essays in Microeconomic Theory
View/Type of Scholarly Publication
DissertationDate of Exam
29.10.2020Date of Publication
22.12.2020Advisor
Rady, SvenCo-Referee
Lauermann, StephanMetadata
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Abstract
This thesis comprises four self-contained essays in economic theory studying the optimal use of private information in strategic interactions. In all the situations considered, non-monetary as well as dynamic incentives play an important role. Chapter 1 contributes to the theory of information design by analysing how information is optimally released to attract attention over time. The questions studied in Chapters 2-4 belong to the theory of mechanism design and contract theory. These chapters aim to understand how information is used to support incentive provision and when it is most effective to acquire costly information.
Subjects
Mikroökonomie, Mechanismusdesign, Informationsdesign, Dynamische Spiele, Vertragstheorie, microeconomics, mechanism design, information design, non-monetary incentives, costly verification
Classification (DDC)
330 WirtschaftKnoepfle, Jan: Essays in Microeconomic Theory. - Bonn, 2020. - Dissertation, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn.
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-60370
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-60370
@phdthesis{handle:20.500.11811/8862,
urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-60370,
author = {{Jan Knoepfle}},
title = {Essays in Microeconomic Theory},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2020,
month = dec,
note = {This thesis comprises four self-contained essays in economic theory studying the optimal use of private information in strategic interactions. In all the situations considered, non-monetary as well as dynamic incentives play an important role. Chapter 1 contributes to the theory of information design by analysing how information is optimally released to attract attention over time. The questions studied in Chapters 2-4 belong to the theory of mechanism design and contract theory. These chapters aim to understand how information is used to support incentive provision and when it is most effective to acquire costly information.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/8862}
}
urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-60370,
author = {{Jan Knoepfle}},
title = {Essays in Microeconomic Theory},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2020,
month = dec,
note = {This thesis comprises four self-contained essays in economic theory studying the optimal use of private information in strategic interactions. In all the situations considered, non-monetary as well as dynamic incentives play an important role. Chapter 1 contributes to the theory of information design by analysing how information is optimally released to attract attention over time. The questions studied in Chapters 2-4 belong to the theory of mechanism design and contract theory. These chapters aim to understand how information is used to support incentive provision and when it is most effective to acquire costly information.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/8862}
}
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