Essays in Microeconomic Theory
Essays in Microeconomic Theory
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DissertationDate of Exam
29.06.2018Date of Publication
20.07.2018Advisor
Szalay, DezsöCo-Referee
Lauermann, StephanMetadata
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Abstract
This dissertation contains three chapters in microeconomic theory, which analyze the impact of asymmetry, information acquisition and disclosure in strategic environments, in particular in auctions and elections. In the first chapter, I analyze what kind of information agents acquire prior to participating in an auction. In the second chapter, I show how asymmetry in the distribution of budget constraints impact the equilibrium in a first-price auction. In the third chapter, a biased information designer seeks to persuade an informed committee of three voters to take her preferred action.
Subjects
Auktionen, Informationsbeschaffung, Budgetbeschränkungen, Wahlentscheidungen, Informationsweitergabe, Budget constraints, information acquisition, information disclosure, auctions, elections
Classification (DDC)
330 WirtschaftBobkova, Nina Vladimirovna: Essays in Microeconomic Theory. - Bonn, 2018. - Dissertation, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn.
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-51433
Online-Ausgabe in bonndoc: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-51433
@phdthesis{handle:20.500.11811/7466,
urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-51433,
author = {{Nina Vladimirovna Bobkova}},
title = {Essays in Microeconomic Theory},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2018,
month = jul,
note = {This dissertation contains three chapters in microeconomic theory, which analyze the impact of asymmetry, information acquisition and disclosure in strategic environments, in particular in auctions and elections. In the first chapter, I analyze what kind of information agents acquire prior to participating in an auction. In the second chapter, I show how asymmetry in the distribution of budget constraints impact the equilibrium in a first-price auction. In the third chapter, a biased information designer seeks to persuade an informed committee of three voters to take her preferred action.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/7466}
}
urn: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:5-51433,
author = {{Nina Vladimirovna Bobkova}},
title = {Essays in Microeconomic Theory},
school = {Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn},
year = 2018,
month = jul,
note = {This dissertation contains three chapters in microeconomic theory, which analyze the impact of asymmetry, information acquisition and disclosure in strategic environments, in particular in auctions and elections. In the first chapter, I analyze what kind of information agents acquire prior to participating in an auction. In the second chapter, I show how asymmetry in the distribution of budget constraints impact the equilibrium in a first-price auction. In the third chapter, a biased information designer seeks to persuade an informed committee of three voters to take her preferred action.},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11811/7466}
}
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