On cooperation and trust in strategic games

Abstract

This thesis is about selected issues of cooperation and trust in strategic games. <br /> This first chapter paper investigates the impact of game presentation on cooperation dependent on subject-pool affiliation. Two cooperation games representing the same logical and strategical decision problem are introduced. Accomplishing a cross-cultural experimental study involving subjects from Abu-Dis (West Bank), Chengdu (China), Helsinki (Finland), and Jerusalem (Israel) we test for a strategic presentation bias applying these two conditions. Subjects in Abu-Dis and Chengdu show a substantially higher cooperation level in the positive externality treatment. In Helsinki and Jerusalem no presentation effect is observed. The same findings hold for associated first-order beliefs. Critically discussing our results, we argue that comparisons across subject-pools might lead to only partially meaningful and opposed conclusions if only one treatment condition is evaluated. <br /> In chapter two three studies predict and find that the individual's conformism values are one determinant of whether behavior is guided by other personal values or by social norms. In study one, pro-gay law reform participants are told they were either in a minority or a majority in terms of their attitude towards the law reform. Only participants who are high in conformism values conform to the group norm on public behavior intentions. In studies two and three, participants play multiple choice prisoner's dilemma games. Only participants who consider conformism values to be relatively unimportant show the expected connections between universalism values and cooperative behavior. Study three also establishes that the moderating effect of conformism values on the relation between universalism values and cooperative behavior is mediated through experienced sense of moral obligation.<br /> In chapter three we study the influence of ethnocentrism on both trusting and reciprocity behavior. We find levels of trust, and partly of reciprocity, to differ significantly in the three subject pools with high Palestinian and low Israeli transfer amounts. The most startling result is the fact that players' beliefs match well the actual behavior of their counterparts from their own country but that they are wrong in predicting the behavior of players located in other countries. Moreover, only slight discrimination among involved cultural groups is found. The data presented support the view that a conflict might not only be triggered by discrimination but may also be enforced by the specific social standards within different societies and ethnocentric biases in beliefs and actions.<br /> In chapter four we experimentally investigate whether job seekers or employees holding a criminal record are less trusted and expected to be less trustworthy compared to not previously convicted workers. In addition, we compare employers' discriminative behavior against ex-offenders with their attitudes against other potential target groups of discrimination as foreigners, women, or elder workers. Our results give substantial support for a clear disadvantage of previously convicted and foreign employees who are less preferred for employment and paid significantly lower wages. However, we find associated beliefs about convicted and foreign employees' reciprocity not to play a primary role in interactions with them. We can also show that employers' discrimination against ex-felons is mainly taste based or avoidance driven. Contrary, foreign workers are basically avoided by employers. For females and males the evidence is mixed: Employers slightly preferred females for hire and paid them higher wages. We suggest investing in prison inmates' education, its certification, as well as signalling it adequately.