Effiziente Umweltauflagen durch abgabenorientierte Sanktionierung?

  • The inefficiency of standards is a well-known result from environmental economics. In this paper we focus on the static inefficiency of an environmental standard as opposed to an environmental tax and discuss suggestions in the literature that adding flexibility to a standard can be used to overcome its efficiency disadvantage. We point out that monitoring and optimally fining high-cost polluters who prefer to secretly emit more than they are allowed to under the standard is not sufficient to replicate the first-best implementation of an emission target achievable under a tax. It has to be supplemented by subsidization of polluters with low marginal abatement costs to induce them to emit less than they are allowed to under the standard. However, we have considerable doubts whether this theoretical possibility of making standards efficient provides good guidance for policy in the real world. Suggesting that polluters optimally violate standards runs the risk of destroying theThe inefficiency of standards is a well-known result from environmental economics. In this paper we focus on the static inefficiency of an environmental standard as opposed to an environmental tax and discuss suggestions in the literature that adding flexibility to a standard can be used to overcome its efficiency disadvantage. We point out that monitoring and optimally fining high-cost polluters who prefer to secretly emit more than they are allowed to under the standard is not sufficient to replicate the first-best implementation of an emission target achievable under a tax. It has to be supplemented by subsidization of polluters with low marginal abatement costs to induce them to emit less than they are allowed to under the standard. However, we have considerable doubts whether this theoretical possibility of making standards efficient provides good guidance for policy in the real world. Suggesting that polluters optimally violate standards runs the risk of destroying the effectiveness of standards as instruments for unconditional achievement of environmental targets.show moreshow less

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Metadaten
Author:Ekkehard von KnorringGND, Peter WelzelGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:384-opus4-265863
Frontdoor URLhttps://opus.bibliothek.uni-augsburg.de/opus4/26586
Series (Serial Number):Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe (170)
Publisher:Volkswirtschaftliches Institut, Universität Augsburg
Place of publication:Augsburg
Type:Working Paper
Language:German
Year of first Publication:1997
Publishing Institution:Universität Augsburg
Release Date:2017/07/21
Pagenumber:20
Institutes:Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät / Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre / Lehrstuhl für Ökonomie der Informationsgesellschaft
Dewey Decimal Classification:3 Sozialwissenschaften / 33 Wirtschaft / 330 Wirtschaft
Journals:Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe
Licence (German):Deutsches Urheberrecht