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- URN zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments:
- urn:nbn:de:bvb:355-epub-363045
- DOI zum Zitieren dieses Dokuments:
- 10.5283/epub.36304
Alternative Links zum Volltext:DOI
Zusammenfassung
There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner's curse because they fail to extract information from hypothetical events - like winning an auction. This paper investigates experimentally whether bidders in a common value auction perform better when the requirements for this cognitive issue - also denoted by contingent reasoning - are relaxed, leaving all other parameters unchanged. The ...
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