The question of how the probabilistic opinions of different individuals should be aggregated to form a group opinion is controversial. But one assumption seems to be pretty much common ground: for a group of Bayesians, the representation of group opinion should itself be a unique probability distribution (Madansky 44; Lehrer and Wagner 34; McConway Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76(374), 410--414, 45; Bordley Management Science, 28(10), 1137--1148, 5; Genest et al. The Annals of Statistics, 487--501, 21; Genest and Zidek Statistical Science, 114--135, 23; Mongin Journal of Economic Theory, 66(2), 313--351, 46; Clemen and Winkler Risk Analysis, 19(2), 187--203, 7; Dietrich and List 14; Herzberg Theory and Decision, 1--19, 28). We argue that this assumption is not always in order. We show how to extend the canonical mathematical framework for pooling to cover pooling with imprecise probabilities (IP) by employing set-valued pooling functions and generalizing common pooling axioms accordingly. As a proof of concept, we then show that one IP construction satisfies a number of central pooling axioms that are not jointly satisfied by any of the standard pooling recipes on pain of triviality. Following Levi (Synthese, 62(1), 3--11, 39), we also argue that IP models admit of a much better philosophical motivation as a model of rational consensus.