Logo Logo
Hilfe
Hilfe
Switch Language to English

Giebe, Thomas und Wolfstetter, Elmar G. (April 2007): License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 199 [PDF, 206kB]

[thumbnail of 199.pdf]
Vorschau
Download (206kB)

Abstract

This paper revisits the licensing of a non–drastic process innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed–fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and losers makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.

Dokument bearbeiten Dokument bearbeiten