Hu, Luke
(Februar 2012):
Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly.
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 377
[PDF, 154kB]
Vorschau
Abstract
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, offer a financial reward to be paid to every short-listed bidders as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for short-listed bidders are costly. Nevertheless, it is generally optimal for the procurer to credibly implement the same restriction of the number of bidders that is optimal under full commitment.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Procurement, auctions, industrial organization, mechanism design |
Fakultät: | Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
Sonderforschungsbereiche > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A7 - Auktionen, Anreizprobleme und Wettbewerb |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | D21, D43, D44, D45 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13177-2 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 13177 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 10. Jul. 2012, 13:05 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Nov. 2020, 12:53 |