Education policy and tax competition with imperfect student and labor mobility

Krieger, Tim; Lange, Thomas

Education policy and tax competition with imperfect student and labor mobility

Dateien

Education_policy_and_tax_competition_with_imperfect_student_and_labor_mobility.pdfGröße: 380.73 KBDownloads: 202

Datum

2008

Autor:innen

Krieger, Tim

Lange, Thomas

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

In this paper we analyze the effect of increasing labor (i.e. graduates /academics ) and student mobility on net tax revenues when revenue-maximizing governments compete for human capital by means of income tax rates and amenities offered to students (positive expenditure) or rather tuition fees (negative expenditure). We demonstrate that these instruments are strategic complements and that increasing labor mobility due to ongoing globalization not necessarily implies intensified tax competition and an erosion of revenues. On the contrary, the equilibrium tax rate even increases in mobility. Amenities offered to students (or rather tuition fees) may either increase or decrease, and, overall, net revenues increase. An increase in student mobility, however, erodes revenues due to intensified tax and amenity competition.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Studentenmobilität, Wettbewerb über öffentliche Ausgaben, labor mobility, student mobility, higher education, tax competition, public expenditure competition

Zitieren

ISO 690

KRIEGER, Tim, Thomas LANGE, 2008. Education policy and tax competition with imperfect student and labor mobility

BibTex

@techreport{Krieger2008Educa-11990,
  year={2008},
  series={Diskussionspapiere der DFG-Forschergruppe Heterogene Arbeit},
  title={Education policy and tax competition with imperfect student and labor mobility},
  number={08,01},
  author={Krieger, Tim and Lange, Thomas}
}

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