Collaborative tax evasion , evasion discount , undeclared work , third-party reporting , field experiment
Abstract:
We conduct a field experiment with sellers of home-improvement services on two German online markets. We take the role of consumers and vary whether we requestan invoice for the delivery of the service. In a market which allows anyone to sellanonymously, a willingness to evade is prevalent. In a market that keeps track ofcredentials, sellers are only willing to evade when a willingness to collude is signaled.The evasion discount is in most estimates not larger than the tax subsidy for legaldemand. Evasion is unlikely to be beneficial for many consumers in our setting.
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