A Dilemma for Empirical Realism: Metaphysical Realism or Instrumentalism

Abstract

In his article “Choosing the Realist Framework” (2011), Stathis Psillos develops an empirical realism; a scientific realism that should be acceptable even to empiricists with metaphysical anxieties. This sounds promising in a time of increased interest in deflationary (neo-Carnapian) approaches to metaphysics. Psillos proposes to regard scientific realism as an ontic framework, i.e. as an answer to the question what it is to be real and not what is real. Adopting the realist framework, the realist ontology follows. While the adoption of an ontic framework is an unforced choice, Psillos argues that one must adopt the realist framework, if one aims for a causally and nomologically coherent image of the world. I argue, on the one hand, that if empirical realism introduces a term ‘real’ that only applies to unobservables, then observables and unobservables are equally real only because the same signifier, ‘real’, is used for two different concepts. On the other hand, insisting that nothing is given prior to the realist framework is in close proximity to idealism. An empirical realist must insist that only some unqualified empirical input is given. However, without a pre-framework ontology, the aim of a causally and nomologically coherent image of the world cannot be conducive to the correct ontology. I propose that this leaves the aim obsolete and thereby empirical realism undefended. I conclude that while the realist framework does reproduce an ontology that resembles the realist ontology, it is questionable whether scientific realists or metaphysical deflationists will find the position attractive.