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Brothers in Arms: Virtue and Pragma-Dialectics

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Abstract

Virtue argumentation theory focuses on the arguers’ character, whereas pragma-dialectics focuses on argumentation as a procedure. In this paper I attempt to explain that both theories are not opposite approaches to argumentation. I argue that, with the help of some non-fundamental changes in pragma-dialectics and some restrictions in virtue argumentation theory, it is possible to regard these theories as complementary approaches to the argumentative practice.

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Notes

  1. Or, if you prefer Wenzel’s (2006) terms, logic focuses on products, dialectic on the procedure, and rhetoric on the process. O’Keefe’s (1977) twofold distinction between argument as product and argument as interaction or process is good enough for my purpose of differentiating logic from dialectic; like virtue argumentation theory, and unlike rhetoric, these two disciplines are normative and hence are the disciplines that I will take into account.

  2. Notice that the principle of honesty might be in tension with the pragma-dialectic principle of externalisation, according to which speculations about what the arguers “think or believe” should be avoided (1992, p. 10). I will not delve into that, however, because arguably speech act theory offers the possibility of making reference to the speaker’s intentions and sincerity.

  3. For a more detailed account of the development of the pragma-dialectical rules, see Zenker (2007).

  4. It is, however, a forbidden topic for the arguers during the discussion. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this clarification.

  5. I thank two anonymous reviewers for this suggestion.

  6. Bowell and Kingsbury say that it is never legitimate to do so. I do not endorse such a strong claim, but the weaker one that in general it is not legitimate. Aberdein (2014) provides several examples in which considerations of character might be relevant in order to accept or reject an argument.

  7. As an anonymous reviewer suggested, another way of looking at this issue could be to hold that the only variant of virtue argumentation theory that is compatible with pragma-dialectics is the modest moderate, in Paglieri’s (2015, p. 77) terms: “cogency is necessary, albeit not sufficient, for argument quality, and moreover it is an aspect of quality that does not require considerations of character to be established.” It is certainly the variant of virtue argumentation theory that I am defending here.

  8. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.

  9. Not all virtue argumentation theorists would agree with this, however. As Paglieri (2015) shows, some proponents of a virtue approach to argumentation hold that the quality of arguments is not determined by the informal logicians’ notion of cogency—the radicals—and others hold that a virtue approach to argumentation can explain cogency—the ambitious moderates. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.

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Acknowledgments

I want to thank Douglas Walton for offering to read and comment on a previous draft, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. I am also in debt to Dan Slee for checking my English. Research funded by a pre-doctoral scholarship of the UNED and by the project FFI2014-53164-P of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness.

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Correspondence to José Ángel Gascón.

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Gascón, J.Á. Brothers in Arms: Virtue and Pragma-Dialectics. Argumentation 31, 705–724 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-017-9423-0

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