

Lukas Mogge

**A District-Level Analysis of the Effect of  
Risk Exposure on the Demand for Index  
Insurance in Mongolia**

# Imprint

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Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB), Department of Economics  
Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany

Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences  
Vogelpothsweg 87, 44227 Dortmund, Germany

Universität Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics  
Universitätsstr. 12, 45117 Essen, Germany

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## Editorial Office

Sabine Weiler

RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-213, e-mail: sabine.weiler@rwi-essen.de

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Lukas Mogge<sup>1</sup>

# A District-Level Analysis of the Effect of Risk Exposure on the Demand for Index Insurance in Mongolia

## Abstract

*This paper provides novel evidence on how risk exposure shapes the demand for index-based weather insurance. The focus is on Mongolia, where index insurance is offered as a commercially marketed product to pastoralists threatened by extreme weather events that cause high livestock mortality. Using a two-way fixed effect model and country-wide district-level data spanning a period of five years, this paper shows that the demand for index insurance increases in areas exposed to adverse weather conditions occurring in the months preceding the end of the insurance sales period. The effect is neither driven by the receipt of insurance payouts nor by observing peers receiving payouts. I argue that these results can be best explained by insurance purchasers adapting their risk perception in response to recent weather risks. The findings of this paper point to a problem for policymakers as a period of mild weather conditions could cause households to lose interest in purchasing insurance, thus leading to underinvestment in insurance coverage.*

*JEL-Codes: O12, O13, O14*

*Keywords: Extreme weather events; index insurance; livestock; risk; Mongolia*

*April 2023*

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<sup>1</sup> Lukas Mogge, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Ruhr University Bochum, Faculty of Management and Economics. – I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments by Kati Krähnert, Svenja Fluhrer, Lemlem Habtemariam, Adam Lederer, Julian Röckert, Daniel Stein, Frank Wätzold, and Toman Barsbai. The paper also benefited from comments provided by participants of the Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 2020, the Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO) Forum 2020, the Annual German Development Economics Conference 2021, the Tropentag 2021, and the Doctoral Workshop 2021 of the Research Group on Development Economics of the German Economic Association. The research was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research in the “Economics of Climate Change” funding line, research grant 01LA1804A, and the German Federal Environmental Foundation (DBU). – All correspondence to: Lukas Mogge, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK), Member of the Leibniz Association, P.O. Box 60 12 03, 14412 Potsdam, Germany, e-mail [mogge@pik-potsdam.de](mailto:mogge@pik-potsdam.de)

## 1. Introduction

Climate change is increasing the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events (IPCC 2012, 2021, 2022; WMO 2020). Such extreme weather events impede development, increase the risk of poverty, and widen existing within-country inequalities (Hallegatte et al. 2017). Smallholder farm households in low- and middle-income countries that depend on natural resources for their living are particularly affected. Not only are these households more geographically exposed to extreme weather events, but they are also less resilient when hit by such shocks (World Bank 2010).

For rural agricultural households, access to formal insurance is an important means to adapt to increasing weather risks (World Bank & United Nations 2010). Yet, in many low- and middle-income countries, conventional, indemnity-based agricultural insurance failed and insurance markets remain underdeveloped (Jensen & Barrett 2017; Platteau et al. 2017). A potential solution that is discussed with much optimism among policy stakeholders and the academic community alike is index-based weather insurance. It relies on an easily observable statistical index, measured at an aggregated geographical level, that is highly correlated with the risk to be insured. Payouts are triggered if the index exceeds (or remains below) a pre-defined threshold (Skees 2008). Compared to indemnity insurance, in which payouts depend on the value of verified losses incurred to the policyholder, the advantage of index insurance is that transaction costs are low. Moreover, in index insurance, the incentive structure is resistant to adverse selection and moral hazard because policyholders do not gain from individual losses (Barnett et al. 2008; Barnett & Mahul 2007). Since the late 1990s, index insurance has been piloted in low- and middle-income countries globally (Greatrex et al. 2015). Despite high hopes among policymakers, most index insurance programs struggle with low take-up rates (Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Carter et al. 2017; Jensen & Barrett 2017).

This paper provides novel evidence on one potential driver of the demand for index insurance that so far has received little attention: the perception of risk. Theory suggests that households' risk perception influences their investments in adaptation measures (Grothmann & Patt 2005), while risk perception, in turn, is shaped by households' exposure to extreme weather (Weber 2006). Yet, empirical research has not systematically investigated the relationship between households' exposure to extreme weather conditions and climate adaptation decisions (Habtemariam et al. 2020). This paper explores how exposure to adverse weather conditions

influences the take-up of index insurance. Its focus is on Mongolia, where index insurance is offered to pastoralists threatened by extremely harsh winter conditions that cause high livestock mortality. The Mongolian Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) has been marketed by private companies in all parts of the country since 2012, allowing this study to draw conclusions from one of the few countries worldwide where index insurance is operating successfully.

The analysis builds on country-wide district-level data spanning the 2012-16 period. Using a two-way fixed effects approach, this paper exploits temporal and spatial variation in the winter intensity below and above the payout-triggering threshold to identify the causal effect of exposure to adverse weather on insurance demand. Results show that both index insurance take-up and the number of insured animals increase in districts exposed to more unfavorable weather conditions occurring in the months preceding the end of the insurance sales period. The design of Mongolian IBLI differs from previously studied index insurance programs in that the sales period of a new insurance season predates the payout period of the previous insurance season. Mongolian pastoralists must decide whether to purchase index insurance coverage for the upcoming winter before potential insurance payouts for the previous period are made. Hence, the observed increase in demand in response to adverse weather cannot be explained by insurance payouts, neither by herders receiving payouts themselves nor by herders observing peers receiving payouts. Moreover, I find that the relationship holds for variation in weather conditions below the threshold that would trigger an index insurance payout, thus making it unlikely that anticipated upcoming insurance payouts can solely explain the observed increase in insurance demand. Finally, there is no evidence that the findings can be explained by serial correlation of risk exposure, the materialization of risk in the subsequent winter period, or exposure to risk in the previous year.

This paper adds to a small literature that draws on several years of panel data to shed light on factors that determine index insurance take-up dynamically over time. Existing studies have shown that the demand for index insurance increases in the aftermath of exposure to adverse weather conditions due to the positive impact of insurance payouts (Bjerge & Trifkovic 2018; Cai et al. 2020; Cole et al. 2014; Hill et al. 2016; Karlan et al. 2014; Stein 2018). In contrast, I study a context in which payouts cannot explain the positive relationship between experiencing adverse weather and insurance demand. Instead, given the short-termism of the effect, I argue that the observed relationship can be best explained by availability bias, with households adapting their risk perception in response to recent exposure to weather risks (Tversky & Kahneman 1973, 1974). Specifically, this paper contributes to the ongoing debate on whether

risk exposure affects the demand for weather insurance in the absence of payouts. This study's results align with findings on availability bias in flood insurance take-up in the US (Gallagher 2014) and with evidence that disaster experience gained in an insurance game increased actual weather insurance take-up in rural China (Cai & Song 2017). However, the results of this paper contrast with those by Che et al. (2019), who do not find evidence for recency effects related to weather exposure in demand for crop insurance in the US, and by Stein (2018), who showed that, in the absence of payouts, exposure to a weather shock lowered the demand for index-based rainfall insurance in India. Hence, to the best of my knowledge, this study provides the first evidence of a positive effect of real-world risk exposure on index insurance in the absence of payouts in the context of the Global South.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the demand for index insurance. Section 3 introduces the empirical context and describes the Mongolian Index-Based Livestock Insurance. Section 4 outlines the empirical approach and describes the data, while section 5 reports the results and discusses the findings. Section 6 concludes.

## 2. Review of the literature on the demand for index insurance

Empirical studies conducted in various countries document that index insurance coverage positively affects insured households. A branch of research exploring the *ex-ante* impact of index insurance (i.e., after an insurance policy is sold but before a payout-triggering event occurs) finds that purchasing insurance increases household welfare even in the absence of a weather shock. Having purchased index insurance induces households to shift from low-risk/low-yield to riskier but more productive investment strategies (Carter et al. 2016; Cole et al. 2017; Hill et al. 2019; Karlan et al. 2014; Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2013). Studies investigating the *ex-post* impacts of insurance payouts on households' recovery from the losses induced by an extreme weather event find that index insurance strengthens the resilience of households. Index insurance payouts facilitate asset recovery (Bertram-Huemmer & Kraehnert 2018), enhance the capacity for consumption smoothing (Janzen & Carter 2018; Jensen et al. 2017), and increase household investments in staple crops (Hill et al. 2019) as well as in other income-generating agricultural activities (Stoeffler et al. 2022).

To understand why the take-up of index insurance is low despite these promising findings, empirical studies are investigating potential barriers to the demand for index insurance. Studies conducting field experiments to explore the determinants of initial take-up of index insurance

have generated several stylized facts. For example, liquidity constraints (Cole et al. 2013), low financial literacy (Gaurav et al. 2011), and the prevalence of basis risk (Hill et al. 2016; Mobarak & Rosenzweig 2013) have been identified as barriers to the demand for insurance.<sup>1</sup>

A smaller set of studies examine household demand for index insurance over time. These empirical investigations require panel data spanning multiple periods, which is only available for a few countries. Cole et al. (2014), Hill et al. (2016), Bjerger and Trifkovic (2018), and Stein (2018) investigate the effects of household exposure to extreme weather events on the demand for rainfall insurance in India. Two further studies from outside India are Karlan et al. (2014), analyzing three years of panel data from Ghana, and Cai et al. (2020), who use a two-year panel from rural China. A common finding is that there is no evidence of habit formation with respect to purchasing index insurance over time. Purchasing insurance in a given period is, by itself, not a good predictor for re-purchasing insurance in the subsequent period (Cai et al. 2020; Hill et al. 2016). However, receiving payouts in a given period is found to increase the likelihood of take-up in subsequent periods in China (Cai et al. 2020), Ghana (Karlan et al. 2014), and India (Cole et al. 2014; Hill et al. 2016; Stein 2018). Several underlying channels are put forward to explain the observed positive relationship between insurance payouts and the subsequent demand for index insurance. For instance, payouts transferred to policyholders have an income effect. Moreover, the effect may work through a behavioral channel if receiving payouts increases household trust in the insurance, as Karlan et al. (2014), Stein (2018), and Cai et al. (2020) hypothesize.

The specific design of the Mongolian IBLI allows me to add to this literature by testing a possible channel explaining the relationship between risk exposure and insurance demand, which has received less attention in the index insurance literature. Theory suggests that awareness of climate risks is an important predictor of adaptive action (Grothmann & Patt 2005; Weber 2006). This corresponds well with findings from the hazard literature showing that households respond strongly to recent disasters (Kunreuther 1996) – a behavioral pattern known as recency or availability bias (Tversky & Kahneman 1973, 1974). Since insurance payouts, by definition, coincide with an extreme weather event, exposure to such an event may also increase the demand for index insurance if it reminds households of the climate risks they face, making it difficult to disentangle the two effects. However, Mongolian IBLI differs in the timing of its sales and payout periods from the index insurance studied by Bjerger and Trifkovic (2018), Cai

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<sup>1</sup> See Carter et al. (2017), Jensen and Barrett (2017), and Platteau et al. (2017) for comprehensive literature reviews.

et al. (2020), Cole et al. (2014), Hill et al. (2016), Karlan et al. (2014), and Stein (2018). Potential customers of Mongolian IBLI need to make their purchase decision for the subsequent insurance period before they know whether and how much payouts they receive from the previous insurance period. This timely arrangement of sales and payout periods of Mongolian IBLI makes it possible to study the direct effects of risk exposure on index insurance demand in isolation from the effects of payouts.

A number of studies find a positive correlation between individuals' exposure to extreme weather events and expressed awareness of climate change in various empirical contexts (Dai et al. 2015; Deressa et al. 2011; Spence et al. 2011; Whitmarsh 2008). However, the few empirical studies analyzing the direct effects of risk exposure, i.e., the effect of experiencing risk without the additional impacts of payouts, on insurance take-up do not derive a common conclusion. In an empirical analysis of the demand for flood insurance across US communities over time, Gallagher (2014) finds that households in non-flooded communities are more likely to purchase flood insurance if they have recently been exposed to information on a flood event within their television media market. Testing the relationship between exposure to adverse weather and participation in the US federal crop insurance program for recency effects, Che et al. (2019) find that county-level insurance demand increases after exposure to adverse weather. However, comparing the effects of previous years' indemnity ratios and weather variables, Che et al. (2019) conclude that weather shocks alone do not explain insurance take-up consistently and that weather shocks increase participation mainly through the receipt of indemnity payouts.

Only two empirical studies specifically analyze the relationship between the direct effects of risk exposure and the uptake of index insurance in the Global South. In a randomized controlled trial conducted in rural China, Cai and Song (2017) show that exposure to a hypothetical disaster during an insurance game increases real-world insurance purchases when index insurance is offered one to three days after the game. On the other hand, Stein (2018) documents that exposure to a weather shock actually lowers the demand for index insurance in the absence of payouts. Using data on a large-scale commercial rainfall insurance program in six Indian states, Stein (2018) finds that villages that were exposed to a rainfall shock in the year before the index insurance scheme was introduced had significantly fewer purchasers during the first insurance sales period than villages that were not affected by such shock.

This paper contributes to this literature by providing new panel data evidence on the effects of climate risks on index insurance take-up by offering novel evidence to the understudied issue of whether risk exposure impacts the demand for insurance in the absence of payouts.


Specifically, regarding the demand for index insurance in the Global South, the paper provides the only analysis to date that uses several years of panel data to study the impact of real-world weather experiences while isolating the direct effects of exposure to weather risk from the effects of payouts. In doing so, this paper adds a new piece of evidence to understand the factors shaping the demand for an insurance product for rural households, which has been discussed with great enthusiasm by policymakers but is struggling with low uptake rates in many places (Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Carter et al. 2017; Jensen & Barrett 2017).

### 3. Index-based livestock insurance in Mongolia

Livestock husbandry plays a central role in the livelihoods of most households in rural Mongolia. In rural areas, livestock is not just the main source of income, it also provides food and is a prominent means of wealth storage (Murphy 2011). In 2012, 27% of all Mongolian households owned livestock and 19% conducted livestock husbandry as their main livelihood and source of income (Mongolian Statistical Information Service 2022). A major threat to pastoralists is extremely harsh winters (*dzud* in Mongolian) that cause sudden and mass livestock mortality, thus directly impairing the very livelihood of herding households. Such extreme winters are caused by one or several unfavorable weather conditions that often reinforce each other, including extremely cold temperatures, excessive snow, too little snow, snowstorms, fluctuations in temperature above and below the freezing point that lead the snow to melt and then ice over, and drought in the preceding summer. The exact triggering conditions differ across winters, which makes modeling winters with weather data challenging (Nandintsetseg et al. 2018; Rao et al. 2015; Tachiiri et al. 2008).

Between 1990 and 2021, major extreme winters struck Mongolia five times (Fig. 1), while additional extreme winters affected only some regions within the country. In the three consecutive extreme winters between 2000 and 2002, over 11 million animals died, reducing the national herd by one-third. In 2009/10, Mongolia experienced the harshest winter on record, with over 10 million animals dead. Extreme winters are shown to have severe socio-economic consequences, including large-scale rural-urban migration of impoverished pastoralists (Roeckert & Kraehnert 2021; Sternberg 2010) as well as reduced child health and lower education outcomes among pastoralists that stayed in the rural herding economy (Groppo & Kraehnert 2016, 2017).

**Figure 1: Annual livestock mortality in Mongolia, 1990-2021.**



Notes: Livestock comprises sheep, goats, cattle, horses, and camels, which are weighted equally here. Only deaths of adult livestock are considered. Years with major extreme winter events are dark shaded. Source: Author’s calculation based on national-level data from the Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

In response to the catastrophic winter events in the early 2000s, the Mongolian Government, with technical support from the World Bank, developed the Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) (Mahul & Skees 2007; World Bank 2016). IBLI was introduced in 2006 as a pilot scheme in three Mongolian provinces. Over time, more provinces were added as IBLI was scaled up stepwise to the national level. Since 2012, IBLI has been offered by various commercial Mongolian insurance companies and two national banks in each of the 339 districts across the country.

In IBLI, the index for triggering payouts is the species-specific livestock mortality rate in a household’s district of residence.<sup>2</sup> The payout-triggering threshold is set for all districts in a given province to either 5 or 6%. If the district-level mortality rate of the species for which a


<sup>2</sup> Typically, herding households in Mongolia follow a semi-nomadic lifestyle with seasonal movements within district boundaries (Teickner et al. 2020). Herder purchase IBLI policies for specific districts.

policyholder purchased IBLI exceeds the threshold in the policyholder’s district, payouts are transferred to the policyholder. The payout rate is calculated as the species-specific mortality rate in the district minus the threshold. The insured household receives the insured value of its herd multiplied by the payout rate.<sup>3</sup> The livestock mortality rates are derived from the Mongolia Livestock Census, which the National Statistical Office of Mongolia (NSO) has implemented each year in December since 1970, as well as the mid-year livestock survey, which records the number of adult animals deceased between December and June. Based on the livestock census (from December) and the mid-year livestock survey (from June), mortality rates occurring during winter and spring are calculated for each species and district.

Between 2012 and 2016, herding households in all Mongolian districts could purchase IBLI policies in sales periods lasting from April to June (Fig. 2). IBLI policies purchased in the sales period of the year  $t$  would cover risks between December of that year and June of the following year. Any occurring payouts are made in August, hence one month after the end of the sales period of the year  $t+1$ .

Households must choose (i) for what species, (ii) for how many animals of each species, and (iii) for how much of the animals’ market value (between 1-100%) they wish to purchase IBLI coverage. In 2012, on average, policyholders insured 30% of their herds’ value (Project Implementation Unit 2012). Insurance premiums and payout rates are defined for each of the five major livestock species. Insurance premiums differ somewhat across districts and species, thus reflecting the differing local historical mortality rates.

**Figure 2: Timeline of insurance seasons.**




Source: The author.

<sup>3</sup> For details on the design of IBLI, see Project Implementation Unit (2012) and Bertram-Huemmer and Kraehnert (2018)

After completing the country-wide rollout in 2012, the demand for IBLI at the national level reached its first peak during the 2013 sales period, when 9.3% of all livestock-owning households purchased IBLI, and then decreased to about 4.7% in the 2015 sales period before increasing again (Fig. 3). After 2016, the selling of IBLI underwent considerable changes. In 2017, the start of the sales period was postponed to February, and in 2018 to January. This expansion of the sales period went hand in hand with the increasing involvement of two commercial banks offering IBLI, gradually replacing insurance agencies as the primary distributor of IBLI policies. According to interviews conducted by the author with staff from the Mongolian National Reinsurance, which coordinates the commercial activities related to IBLI, the extension of the sales period was made on the request of Khaan Bank and State Bank, two Mongolian commercial banks active in selling IBLI policies. The postponement of the start of the sales period allowed the two banks to market IBLI in January and February, a period with a traditionally large amount of interaction between banks and herding households. The share of IBLI policies sold by banks increased from 39% in 2016 to 80.6% in 2019. To analyze the dynamics of the demand for IBLI in the absence of confounding effects related to the extension of the sales period, this study focuses on the time window between the completion of the rollout and the policy change.

Most of the livestock covered under IBLI are goats and sheep, which together account for more than 90% of the insured animals. This figure corresponds to the share of goats and sheep among the total number of animals, which was 87% in 2012 (Mongolian Statistical Information Service 2022).

**Figure 3: Number of households that purchased IBLI and number of insured livestock in Mongolia, 2012-21.**



Notes: The grey line marks the last year before the IBLI sales period was expanded. Source: Author's calculation based on national-level data from the Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

#### 4. Empirical approach and data

I use a two-way fixed effects approach to estimate the causal effect of recent exposure to risk on the demand for index insurance over time, exploiting the exogenous nature of weather conditions as well as their spatial and temporal variation. Drawing on data derived from the Mongolian Livestock Census and other publicly available data provided by the Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022), I estimate the following model:

$$IBLI_{dt} = \beta_1 Risk Exposure_{dt} + \beta X_{dt} + \alpha_d + \lambda_t + \gamma_p t + \epsilon_{dt} \quad (1)$$

where the dependent variable is demand for index insurance in district  $d$  and year  $t$ .  $Risk Exposure_{dt}$  is a proxy of the weather risk to which herders in district  $d$  were exposed in the months before the end of the sales period.  $X_{dt}$  is a vector of time-varying district-level characteristics. The equation contains district fixed effects ( $\alpha_d$ ), year fixed effects ( $\lambda_t$ ), province-level linear time trends ( $\gamma_p t$ ), as well as a stochastic error term ( $\epsilon_{dt}$ ). The district fixed

effects account for unobserved characteristics at the district level that remain constant over time, whereas the year fixed effects control for changes over the years that affect all districts in the same way. Linear time trends at the province level, the administrative level above districts, control for different trends in insurance demand at the level decisive for the timing of the rollout and the level of the payout-triggering threshold.<sup>4</sup>

The primary data source for this analysis is the Mongolian Livestock Census, which collects data from each livestock owner in Mongolia by the NSO each year in December. The census records the livestock owned at the time of the interview and livestock lost in the previous 12 months, broken down by species, as well as IBLI uptake and the number of insured animals. Aggregated livestock and index insurance data on the district level is made available by the Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022). The balanced sample comprises 326 Mongolian districts and 1,630 district-year observations in the period between 2012 and 2016.<sup>5</sup> I do not consider data before 2012, as the country-wide rollout of IBLI was only completed in 2012. Furthermore, I abstain from using data for years later than 2016, when the selling regime of IBLI underwent considerable changes (see Section 3).


I explore the demand for index insurance at the district level at both the extensive and intensive margin, employing as dependent variables the share of herding households purchasing IBLI per district and the number of insured animals per herding household in a district. The spatial and temporal variation of the share of herding households purchasing IBLI across districts is displayed in Fig. 4. In 2012, the share of insured herding households varied between 0 and 84% across the districts in the balanced sample. In 2016, the share varied between 0 and 74%. There is also a stark variation in the year-to-year changes in the share of insured households. Compared with the previous year, the share of insured herding households increased in 61 percent of the districts in 2013, 31 percent of the districts in 2014, 27 percent of the districts in 2015, and 71 percent of the districts in 2016.

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<sup>4</sup> Excluding the capital Ulaanbaatar, the country is composed of 21 provinces or *aimags* (the first-level administrative division), which are further divided into 331 districts or *soums* (the second-level administrative subdivision).

<sup>5</sup> Mongolia comprises 339 districts in total. I have incomplete information on the mortality rate of sheep and goats for 13 districts, including all nine districts of Ulaanbaatar where animal husbandry play only a marginal economic role. For three further districts, I lack information on district-level insurance demand and for one further district, I lack information on livestock numbers.

**Figure 4: Share of insured herders per district, 2012-2016.**



Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

To measure risk exposure, I employ the district-level mortality of sheep and goats (referred to as small animal mortality in the following). Sheep and goats combined comprise more than 90% of the insured livestock and had similar mortality rates during past extreme events.<sup>6</sup> While single weather variables are not suited for capturing winter intensity, which depends on a complex interplay of temperature, snow depth, snow density, wind, and grazing conditions, district-level livestock mortality is considered a good proxy for local weather conditions during the winter (Skees & Enkh-Amgalan 2002). The time window when most livestock dies as a result of extreme weather conditions is late winter and spring (December-May), hence yearly mortality rates are largely driven by animal deaths occurring in the months before the end of

<sup>6</sup> During the 2009/10 extreme winter, the country-wide mortality rates of sheep, goats, cattle, horses, and camels were 23, 26, 21, 16, and 6%, respectively (Mongolian Statistical Information Service 2020).

the IBLI sales period (April-June).<sup>7</sup> It is very unlikely that individual herders can influence district-level livestock mortality, given an average population of 632 herding households per district.<sup>8</sup>

I use three alternative measures of risk exposure based on small animal mortality. The first measure is the continuous district-level mortality rate.

As a second measure of risk exposure, I employ an indicator variable that equals one if goat or sheep mortality in the district exceeds the threshold for triggering index insurance payouts. With exposure to sufficiently high small animal mortality rates, insured households might anticipate receiving payouts in the upcoming August, i.e., one month after the end of the insurance sales period. This measure allows testing whether exposure to mortality rates that are high enough to induce a payout in the near future increases demand, though it cannot distinguish between the effect of anticipating a payout and the awareness effect induced by experiencing weather risk.

Third, I transform the continuous small animal mortality rate into five mutually exclusive categories, grouping small animal mortality into 1.5 percentage-point bins. The use of categories based on mortality bins makes it possible to analyze the heterogeneous effects of different intensities of small animal mortality on insurance demand. The first category, the reference category, contains all district-year observations with small animal mortality rates below 1.5% (72% of the observations in the balanced sample). The second category contains all observations with mortality rates between 1.5 and 2.99% (16% of the observations). The third category covers the range from 3 to 4.49% (5% of the observations), and the fourth category from 4.5 to 5.99% (2% of the observations). The fifth category contains all observations with small animal mortality rates above 6% (4% of the observations). Comparing the second and third categories against the reference category allows for investigating the direct effect of exposure to weather risk in isolation of any additional impact caused by the anticipation of payouts.

The distribution of district-level small animal mortality between 2012 and 2016 is displayed in Fig. 5. Small animal mortality varied between 0 and 8% in 2012, between 1 and 50% in 2013,

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<sup>7</sup> Quarterly livestock data, aggregated to the national-level data, shows that between 2012 and 2016, 78% of recorded small animal deaths occurred between January and June (Mongolian Statistical Information Service 2022).

<sup>8</sup> The smallest district in the sample has 108 households and the largest has a population of 2,009 herding households.

between 0 and 8% in 2014 and 2015, and between 0 and 19% in 2016 in the balanced sample. While larger livestock mortality rates occur spatially clustered in individual years, there is considerable heterogeneity in affected regions over time. Adverse winter conditions affected different parts of the country in different years, with varying levels of small animal mortality observed even among neighboring districts.

**Figure 5: Small animal mortality per district, 2012-2016.**



Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

The choice of time-varying control variables is informed by the literature on insurance take-up and previous work on responses to adverse weather conditions in Mongolia. It is suggested that a lack of liquidity or wealth can be an obstacle to purchasing index insurance (Giné et al. 2008), hence the total value of outstanding loans and savings as proxies for district-level liquidity are included as control variables. Wealth in livestock is measured by the average herd size among

pastoralist households in a given district, transformed into sheep forage units (SFU).<sup>9</sup> The herd size also reflects the absolute risk that a household can choose to insure when purchasing index insurance, as Jensen et al. (2018) point out. Thus, while wealthier households are more likely to have the means to purchase insurance, their higher absolute risk should further increase the demand for insurance if they are not risk-seeking. As shown in Roeckert and Kraehnert (2021), exposure to adverse weather leads to increases in outmigration from affected areas as well as a reduction of active herding households, which is why I control for the number of herding households per district. All controls are measured at the end of the year, i.e., after the realization of both the weather risk and the insurance decision, making them potentially endogenous. All main results are hence shown with and without controls. As I expect all controls to be negatively affected by small animal mortality while being positively correlated with demand for index insurance, including controls can be considered a more conservative estimation of the true relationship between risk exposure and insurance demand.

Summary statistics of the main variables used in the district-level analysis are displayed in Table 1.

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<sup>9</sup> Sheep forage units is the conversion rate commonly used in Mongolia. Sheep forage units standardize different species to the feeding requirement of one sheep for one year (365 kg/year of forage). One sheep equals 1 SFU, one goat equals 0.9 SFU, one cow equals 6 SFU, one horse equals 7 SFU, and one camel equals 5 SFU.

**Table 1: Summary statistics.**

	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Districts
<i>Dependent variable</i>					
Share of herding households purchasing IBLI	8.32	8.91	0.13	72.27	326
Number of insured animals per herding household	17.51	23.49	0.07	184.28	326
<i>District characteristics</i>					
Average herd size (in SFU)	422.61	147.49	39.28	980.97	326
Total deposits (in billion MNT)	3.30	10.37	0.08	128.82	326
Outstanding loans (in billion MNT)	7.24	20.01	0.56	200.62	326
Herding households	630.55	296.81	108	2,009	326
<i>District-level livestock mortality rates</i>					
Small animal mortality in 2012 (%)	1.04	1.18	0.00	8.01	326
Small animal mortality in 2013 (%)	1.83	3.39	0.01	50.10	326
Small animal mortality in 2014 (%)	0.77	1.04	0.00	8.05	326
Small animal mortality in 2015 (%)	1.06	1.21	0.00	8.48	326
Small animal mortality in 2016 (%)	2.43	3.24	0.01	19.32	326

Notes: District characteristics and the dependent variable are displayed as within-district averages over time in the 2012-2016 period. Small animal mortality is the average mortality of sheep and goats. In June 2012, 10,000 Mongolian Tugrik (MNT) were worth 7.57 USD. Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

## 5. Results and discussion

Starting with the determinants of the district-level demand for index insurance on the extensive margin, Table 2 displays regression results where the dependent variable is the share of households purchasing index insurance per district. Columns 1 and 2 present results for the effect of small animal mortality in the current year, i.e., occurring mainly between January and May and thus shortly before and during the sales period of IBLI policies (April to June) that cover risks in the following winter. The effect of exposure to small animal mortality is significant, positive, and sizable (col. 1). A one percentage point increase in the district-level mortality of small animals in the current year increases the share of herding households purchasing IBLI to cover weather risks in the upcoming winter by 0.3 percentage points, or 3 percent of the average share of insured herding households, holding all else constant. When including district-level controls, the effect is 0.2 percentage points (col. 2).

In column 3, risk exposure is measured with an indicator variable that equals one if the mortality rates of either sheep or goats exceed the payout-triggering threshold. Exceeding payout-triggering mortality rates for either sheep or goats increases the share of insured households by around 2.4 percentage points, holding everything else constant. In the specification with controls, the effect is 2.2 percentage points (col. 4).

Columns 5 and 6 display the result for indicator variables of mutually exclusive categories of small animal mortality. The reference category is small animal mortality below 1.5%. Compared to the reference category, districts exposed to small animal mortality rates of 1.5% or more have a significantly higher share of households purchasing index insurance. This includes the variation in exposure to mortality rates below the threshold for triggering insurance payouts. I interpret this as evidence that small increases in the intensity of risk exposure can increase demand even in the absence of any future payouts that are to be materialized one month after the end of the sales period but may already be anticipated by the insured herding households. Exposure to small animal mortality rates between 1.5 and 2.99% increases the share of households purchasing IBLI by 0.7 percentage points compared to the reference category. Exposure to mortality rates between 3-4.49% increase the share of purchasers by 1.9 percentage points. Districts with a mortality rate between 4.5 and 5.99% experience an increase in the share of insurance purchasers by about 2.4 percentage points compared to districts with a mortality rate of below 1.5%. A small animal mortality rate of over 6% increases the share of herding households purchasing index insurance by 3.6 percentage points. Including time-variant district control variables slightly reduces the magnitude of the estimated effects, while the effects for the indicators of interest remain statistically significant at the 10% level for all but the smallest category (col. 6).

**Table 2: Determinants of index insurance demand at the extensive margin.**

Dependent variable: Share of households purchasing IBLI	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Small animal mortality	0.281** (0.040)	0.245* (0.073)				
Sheep or goat mortality exceeds threshold			2.441*** (0.004)	2.198*** (0.010)		
Small animal mortality [1.5-2.99%]					0.679* (0.092)	0.612 (0.132)
Small animal mortality [3-4.49%]					1.916** (0.017)	1.868** (0.019)
Small animal mortality [4.5-5.99%]					2.354** (0.037)	2.133* (0.058)
Small animal mortality [ $\geq 6\%$ ]					3.584*** (0.001)	3.307*** (0.004)
Average herd size (log)		-4.158* (0.096)		-4.729** (0.041)		-3.389 (0.154)
Total deposits (log)		0.244 (0.821)		0.295 (0.790)		0.331 (0.759)
Outstanding loans (log)		0.739 (0.287)		0.847 (0.229)		0.767 (0.265)
Herding households (log)		-6.161* (0.072)		-5.938* (0.085)		-6.402* (0.063)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
Number of districts	326	326	326	326	326	326
Observations	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630

Notes: Estimates from OLS estimation with district and year fixed effects. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016. P-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

Table 3 investigates the effect of exposure to weather risk on index insurance demand at the intensive margin, measured by the number of insured animals per herding household in a district. Overall, the results are similar compared to Table 2 in terms of the direction and significance of the effect, showing that in addition to being more likely to purchase insurance, herding households also insure more animals when being exposed to risk.

There are positive and significant effects for the continuous measure of small animal mortality, with a one percentage point higher mortality rate leading to a 0.3 increase in the number of insured animals per herding household in the specification without controls (col. 1). When including controls the effect is 0.2 (col. 2).

The effect for the indicator of sheep or goat mortality rates above the payout-triggering threshold is 3.4 in the model without controls and 3.6 in the model with controls, both effects being significant at the 1% level (col. 3-4).

There are positive effects on the demand for IBLI on the extensive margin for all small animal mortality categories compared to the reference category (col. 5-6). In the specification without controls (col. 5), exposure to small animal mortality between 1 and 2.99% increases the number of insured animals per herding household by 1.4 compared to the reference category. With a p-value of 0.144, the effect is not significant at conventional levels. Exposure to mortality rates between 3 and 4.49% increases the number of insured animals per herding household by 4.5, significant at the 5% level. The effect of exposure to mortality rates between 4.5-5.99% increases the number of insured animals per herding household by 2.3. However, with a p-value of 0.301, the effect is not significant at conventional levels. Mortality rates over 6% are associated with an increase of 6.4 insured animals per herding household, significant at the 1% level. Including controls slightly increases the magnitude of the effects, with the effect of exposure to small animal mortality between 1 and 2.99% now being significant at the 10% level (col. 6). The positive and significant estimates of the indicators for the small animal mortality categories in columns 5 and 6, some of which clearly below the payout-triggering threshold, provide evidence that small increases in risk exposure increase the demand for insurance at the intensive margin in the absence of actual and anticipated payouts.

**Table 3: Determinants of index insurance demand at the intensive margin.**

Dependent variable: Insured animals per herding household	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Small animal mortality	0.535** (0.043)	0.615** (0.041)				
Sheep or goat mortality exceeds threshold			3.353** (0.035)	3.698** (0.020)		
Small animal mortality [1.5-2.99%]					1.453 (0.144)	1.656* (0.086)
Small animal mortality [3-4.49%]					3.044** (0.025)	3.436** (0.012)
Small animal mortality [4.5-5.99%]					2.348 (0.301)	2.771 (0.233)
Small animal mortality [ $\geq 6\%$ ]					6.397*** (0.004)	7.350*** (0.001)
Average herd size (log)		6.811 (0.300)		3.710 (0.535)		7.327 (0.237)
Total deposits (log)		-1.677 (0.530)		-1.632 (0.546)		-1.626 (0.542)
Outstanding loans (log)		3.600** (0.034)		3.751** (0.030)		3.654** (0.030)
Herding households (log)		-10.500* (0.097)		-9.875 (0.123)		-11.058* (0.082)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18
Number of districts	326	326	326	326	326	326
Observations	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630

Notes: Estimates from OLS estimation with district and year fixed effects. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016. P-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Source: the Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

### *Serial correlation and temporal adverse selection*

The presented results indicate that the demand for index insurance increases in districts exposed to higher mortality rates in the previous winter, suggesting that households' insurance demand responds to recent experiences of payouts and realized weather risk. As discussed by Jensen et al. (2018), temporal adverse selection into purchasing index insurance is possible if over-time

variations in risks are observed by households but not accounted for in the design of the insurance contract. Hence, an alternative explanation for the positive effect of district-level small animal mortality on purchases of index insurance could be that weather risk is positively autocorrelated and that households use that knowledge when making their index insurance purchase decisions. I empirically test if local year-to-year variability in weather risk is autocorrelated by regressing the district-level small animal mortality on its lagged values. Results from district fixed effects and Arellano-Bond estimations for the balanced sample of 326 districts for the 2012-2021 time period are displayed in Table 4.<sup>10</sup> I find significant and negative effects of the previous year's small animal mortality on its current value across all fixed effects models and an insignificant effect when considering the Arellano-Bond estimation, dismissing that the positive effect of small animal mortality on index insurance demand could be driven by temporal adverse selection.

**Table 4: Autocorrelation in district-level small animal mortality.**

Dependent variable: Small animal mortality	District fixed effects			Arellano-Bond
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Small animal mortality in year $t-1$	-0.104*** (0.000)	-0.125*** (0.000)	-0.183*** (0.000)	-0.247*** (0.000)
Small animal mortality in year $t-2$		-0.073*** (0.003)	-0.103*** (0.001)	
Small animal mortality in year $t-3$			0.107* (0.055)	
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.01	0.01	0.03	
Number of districts	326	326	326	326
Observations	2,934	2,608	2,282	2,608

Notes: Columns 1-3 display results of district fixed effects estimations with 1 to 3-year lags of the dependent variable used as explanatory variables. Column 4 displays results of an Arellano-Bond estimation with 3 lags of the dependent variable used as instruments. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2021 in column 1, between 2013 and 2021 in columns 2 and 4, and between 2014 and 2021 in column 3. P-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

<sup>10</sup> District-level mortality data by species is available from 2012 onwards. The results are similar to an estimate of autocorrelation in province-level livestock mortality in the period 1992-2018 conducted in Roeckert and Kraehnert (2021).

Next, I test whether the share of households purchasing IBLI and the number of insured animals per household are driven by exposure to adverse weather that materializes in the subsequent winter period or that has materialized in the previous year. Table 5 displays the effects of one-year leads and lags of small animal mortality, both for the continuous measure and the indicator for threshold-exceeding sheep or goat mortality rates. Columns 1 and 2 explore the effects of risk exposure in year  $t+1$ , which only starts to materialize seven months after the end of the sales period of year  $t$ , on the demand for IBLI at the extensive margin. The effect of small animal mortality rates in year  $t+1$  on IBLI uptake in the sales period of year  $t$  is negative yet not significant at conventional levels, with a p-value of 0.180. The effect of being exposed to payout-triggering rates in year  $t+1$  is also negative and statistically not significant (p-value: 0.244), providing further evidence against the occurrence of temporal adverse selection. Columns 3 and 4 display the results of the effects of the previous year's risk exposure, i.e., of small animal mortality that materialized mainly in the early months of year  $t-1$ , up to 12 months before the start of the insurance sales period in year  $t$ . Both the measure of continuous mortality rates (col. 3) and exposure to payout-triggering rates (col. 4) in year  $t-1$  do not significantly affect the share of households purchasing IBLI in year  $t$ . When considering the intensive margin (col. 5-8), i.e., the number of insured animals per herding household, the effect of exposure to higher rates of small animal mortality in the subsequent year is negative and significant at the 5% level (col. 5). A one percentage point higher small animal mortality in year  $t+1$  is associated with 0.27 less insured animals per herding household in year  $t$ . The effect of payout-triggering rates in year  $t+1$  is negative but insignificant (col. 6). There is no significant effect of risk exposure in year  $t-1$  on the number of insured animals per herding household in year  $t$  (col. 7-8).

Taken together, Tables 4 and 5 present strong evidence against possible temporal self-selection as a driver of the baseline results. Households, on average, do not seem able to predict risk exposure in the upcoming winter and selectively purchase insurance for periods in which larger small animal mortality rates materialize. Furthermore, the small and insignificant effects of small animal mortality in the previous year suggest that the effect of risk exposure on index insurance demand is most pronounced in the short term. Being able to rule out any effects of actual or anticipated payouts, I argue that these results can be most plausibly explained by households becoming more likely to purchase index insurance coverage due to increased risk awareness – a finding that corresponds well with theoretical work and empirical evidence that perceptions of risk are not stable over time but is driven directly by exposure to events (Gallagher 2014; Kunreuther 1996).

**Table 5: Determinants of insurance demand with lags and leads.**

Dependent variable:	Share of households purchasing IBLI				Insured animals per herding household			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Small animal mortality in year $t+1$	-0.083 (0.180)				-0.268** (0.029)			
Sheep or goat mortality exceeds threshold in year $t+1$		-0.677 (0.244)				-1.858 (0.119)		
Small animal mortality in year $t-1$			0.090 (0.366)				0.013 (0.930)	
Sheep or goat mortality exceeds threshold in year $t-1$				-0.218 (0.778)				-0.830 (0.664)
District Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.29	0.29	0.35	0.35	0.17	0.17	0.20	0.20
Number of districts	326	326	326	326	326	326	326	326
Observations	1,630	1,630	1,304	1,304	1,630	1,630	1,304	1,304

Notes: Estimates from OLS estimation with district and year fixed effects. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016 in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6. The sample in the remaining columns contains observations between 2013 and 2016. P-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Source: the Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

### *Sensitivity checks and robustness considerations*

In the baseline model, I categorize small animal mortality rates into 1.5- percentage-point bins when exploring the heterogeneous effects of different intensities of risk exposure on insurance demand. To demonstrate that the displayed results are not sensitive to the exact choice of bin sizes, Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix display results where I use 1-percentage-point, 2-percentage-point, and 2.5-percentage-point steps instead. Districts exposed to higher mortality rates have significantly larger shares of insured herding households than the respective reference categories – even if the district mortality rate remains below 5% (Fig. A1). On the intensive margin, the number of insured animals per household also increases in all categories compared to the reference categories in the alternative specifications (Fig. A2).

One potential concern is that districts with smaller herder populations in which decisions of fewer households can have a larger impact drive the results. To explore this possibility, I re-

estimate the main specification with the average number of herding households between 2012 and 2016 as analytical weights (Table A1). Results remain qualitatively similar to the baseline model.

Table A2 in the Appendix presents results when excluding 95 district-year observations where no household purchased index insurance. Even though it is possible that no herding household decided to purchase index insurance, I lack information on marketing activities to rule out that no IBLI sales activities occurred in those districts in the given years. The effects on the reduced unbalanced sample remain positive and significant for the continuous measure of small animal mortality, for sheep or goat mortality above the payout-triggering level, and for most of the small animal mortality categories (based on 1.5-percentage point bins) below the payout-triggering threshold.

Table A3 presents results for a sample that excludes 21 districts that are province centers where herders are arguably easier to reach for insurance agents and where herders face lower transportation costs when considering to purchase index insurance. Results obtained for this more homogenous sample of rural districts are comparable to the main results.

A further heterogeneity in the data is the timing of the insurance rollout. IBLI was first piloted in 2006 in three provinces (containing 18% of districts in the balanced sample) and then stepwise introduced in further provinces in 2009 (4%), 2010 (24%), 2011 (30%), and 2012 (23% of districts in the balanced sample). The difference in exposure to IBLI could potentially lead to different learning effects about the insurance product, resulting in different reactions to exposure to adverse weather conditions. While districts in which IBLI was piloted in 2006 have higher levels of demand throughout our period of interest, trends are broadly similar, with peak demand in 2013 and a low point in 2015 on all rollout-year groups (Fig. A3). The starkest contrast might arguably be in whether districts had access to insurance before the 2009/10 winter, the event that caused the single most outstanding livestock losses in the past 50 years. When considering separately districts in which IBLI was available before the 2010 extreme winter event and districts in which IBLI was not available at that time, I find that in both groups of districts, exposure to higher mortality rates increases the demand on both the extensive margin (Fig. A4) and the intensive margin Fig (A5), though results are insignificant in the smaller group of districts where IBLI was rolled-out before 2010. Hence, there is no evidence that insurance demand responds differently to risk exposure in districts where IBLI was introduced earlier and herding households might thus arguably have had more time to learn about the insurance product.

Finally, to address that small animal mortality data are a spatial process, I account for potential spatial autocorrelation using Conley standard errors (Conley 1999). Table A4 displays the main results with Conley standard errors, including a distance linear decay in the correlation structure and a 320km distance cutoff, allowing each district to have at least five neighbors in its spatial cluster.<sup>11</sup> Again, results from the baseline model are confirmed.

In sum, the presented results suggest a strong relationship between exposure to weather risk in the current year and the decision of households to purchase IBLI coverage for the upcoming winter. Finding such a strong relationship is remarkable, given that the fixed effects approach exclusively considers within-district variation. These results are derived from a context where households must make their purchase decision before learning about insurance payouts from the previous insurance season. Furthermore, I repeatedly find that higher mortality rates of small animals, even below the payout-triggering threshold, are associated with higher insurance demand. This provides robust evidence that exposure to weather risk does not affect index insurance take-up exclusively through channels related to insurance payouts, such as income effects or increased trust in the insurance product and the commercial insurance companies. Instead, the results suggest that it is the exposure to weather risk *per se* that drives the demand for IBLI, with households adapting their risk perception in response to recent weather risks.

## 6. Conclusion and outlook

Drawing on five years of district-level data covering all of Mongolia, this paper provides new insights into the role of risk exposure for the demand for index-based livestock insurance in Mongolia over time. Exploiting the unique timely arrangement of the sales and payout periods in one of the few commercially viable index insurance programs worldwide, this paper studies the effect of real-world risk exposure on index insurance demand in the absence of payouts.

Demand for index insurance is volatile over the period covered by this study. I present evidence that this fluctuation in insurance take-up over time is partly driven by exposure to risk. Results from two-way fixed effects estimations show that households are significantly more likely to purchase index insurance covering the upcoming winter season when they live in an area

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<sup>11</sup> The mean distance between two districts is 656km, with the shortest and the longest distance to the nearest neighboring district being 264km and 2,177km, respectively. Distances are measured between district centers. Conley standard errors are implemented with the `acreg` command (version 1.1.0, Colella et al. 2019) in STATA. Varying the distance cutoff between 264km and 1,000km leads to quantitatively similar results.

exposed to adverse weather conditions in the current year. The sales period during which herders need to make a decision on whether to purchase index insurance for the next season ends before any payouts from the previous insurance season are distributed. Given the unique design of the Mongolian index insurance, I can rule out that these effects are driven by insurance payouts, which have been proposed as the main underlying channel in previous studies (Bjerge & Trifkovic 2018; Cai et al. 2020; Cole et al. 2014; Hill et al. 2016; Karlan et al. 2014; Stein 2018).

This study contributes to the debate on what mechanisms drive households' adaptive action. It is the first study to provide evidence that real-world risk exposure increases the demand index insurance, even in the absence of payouts, within a Global South context. Albeit covering a very different empirical context, the results of this paper fit with Gallagher's (2014) study of the demand for flood insurance in the US. Both Gallagher and this study provide evidence that weather events occurring in the recent past have a short-term impact on the demand for index insurance by changing households' risk awareness. Arguably, this finding is more surprising in the context of Mongolian pastoralists since understanding weather patterns and the associated risk is essential for the survival of herding households whose livelihood depends immediately on weather conditions.

Index-based insurance is often highlighted as a promising tool to increase the resilience of rural farm households that are vulnerable to weather shocks. Yet, a common experience in index insurance pilot projects around the globe is that the demand for insurance among smallholder farmers and pastoralists is lower than anticipated. With extreme winters becoming more frequent, the demand for index insurance among Mongolian pastoralists might increase in the future if households update their assessment of the associated risks accordingly. However, the risk perception channel might also work in the other direction: A spell of mild winters can cause households to lose interest in purchasing insurance. Practical implications from this finding could be drawn in the field of communications with potential customers. If the goal is to encourage index insurance take-up among smallholder farmers, then one possibility could be to increase the awareness of risks stemming from extreme weather events. This could be done through means of targeted information on the local historical occurrences of such events.

Some additional open questions remain for further research. While the available district-level data allows for a robust analysis of the relationship between exposure to weather risk and demand for index insurance, I cannot study important heterogeneities at the household level, e.g., wealth, income, or realized basis risk. Moreover, while I argue that changes in risk

preferences can explain well the perceived pattern, the present data do not allow to study the direct effects of risk exposure on risk preferences.

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
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
# Appendix

**Figure A1: Determinants of index insurance demand at the extensive margin with varying bins of small animal mortality.**




Notes: Displayed are OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals that are derived from estimating Eq. 1 with alternative sets of indicator variables as measure of risk exposure at the district level. The dependent variable is the share of households purchasing IBLI per district. Indicator variables are constructed by grouping small animal mortality into mutually exclusive categories with 1.5, 2, and 2.5 percentage-point bins. The reference categories are 0-1.5%, 0-2%, and 0-2.5%, respectively. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016. Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

**Figure A2: Determinants of index insurance demand at the intensive margin with varying bins of small animal mortality.**




Notes: Displayed are OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals that are derived from estimating Eq. 1 with alternative sets of indicator variables as measure of risk exposure at the district level. The dependent variable is the number of insured animals per herding household per district. Indicator variables are constructed by grouping small animal mortality into mutually exclusive categories with 1.5, 2, and 2.5 percentage-point bins. The reference categories are 0-1.5%, 0-2%, and 0-2.5%, respectively. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016. Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

**Figure A3: Share of households that purchased IBLI in balanced sample, by rollout years**




Notes: Rollout years refer to the year in which IBLI became available in a province. Rollout years were 2006 (18% of districts in balanced sample), 2009 (4%), 2010 (24%), 2011 (30%), and 2012 (23% of districts in balanced sample). Source: Author’s calculation based on national-level data from the Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

**Figure A4: Determinants of index insurance demand at the extensive margin with effects for rollout before and after winter 2009/10.**



Notes: Displayed are OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals that are derived from estimating Eq. 1 separately for districts with rollout years between 2006 and 2009 (N=69) and 2010 and 2012 (N=246). The dependent variable is the share of households purchasing IBLI per district. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016. Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

**Figure A5: Determinants of index insurance demand at the intensive margin with effects for rollout before and after winter 2009/10.**



Notes: Displayed are OLS point estimates and 90% confidence intervals that are derived from estimating Eq. 1 separately for districts with rollout years between 2006 and 2009 (N=69) and 2010 and 2012 (N=246). The dependent variable is the number of insured animals per herding household per district. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016. Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

**Table A1: Determinants of index insurance demand at the extensive and intensive margin with districts weighted by the number of herding households**

Dependent variable:	Share of households purchasing IBLI			Insured animals per herding household		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Small animal mortality	0.294** (0.015)			0.753*** (0.004)		
Sheep or goat mortality exceeds threshold		1.743* (0.068)			3.231* (0.067)	
Small animal mortality [1.5-2.99%]			0.825** (0.044)			1.763* (0.056)
Small animal mortality [3-4.49%]			1.953*** (0.010)			3.746*** (0.001)
Small animal mortality [4.5-5.99%]			1.762 (0.120)			2.357 (0.293)
Small animal mortality [ $\geq 6\%$ ]			3.256*** (0.010)			7.593*** (0.002)
Average herd size (log)	-1.838 (0.474)	-3.232 (0.167)	-1.672 (0.495)	12.232* (0.062)	7.572 (0.204)	11.529* (0.071)
Total deposits (log)	0.462 (0.685)	0.405 (0.725)	0.433 (0.702)	-2.092 (0.396)	-2.303 (0.358)	-2.267 (0.355)
Outstanding loans (log)	0.623 (0.459)	0.639 (0.458)	0.635 (0.451)	3.666* (0.059)	3.689* (0.063)	3.732* (0.054)
Herding households (log)	-4.149 (0.201)	-3.666 (0.261)	-4.405 (0.180)	-5.033 (0.400)	-3.585 (0.552)	-5.413 (0.367)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.17	0.16	0.17
Number of districts	326	326	326	326	326	326
Observations	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630

Notes: Estimates from weighted OLS estimation with district and year fixed effects. Each district is weighted by its average population of herding households in the 2012-2016 period. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016. P-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

**Table A2: Determinants of index insurance demand at the extensive and intensive margin in sample excluding district-year observations with no insurance purchases.**

Dependent variable:	Share of households purchasing IBLI			Insured animals per herding household		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Small animal mortality	0.243*			0.634**		
	(0.088)			(0.048)		
Sheep or goat mortality exceeds threshold		2.289**			4.141**	
		(0.011)			(0.014)	
Small animal mortality [1.5-2.99%]			0.679			1.772*
			(0.114)			(0.084)
Small animal mortality [3-4.49%]			1.856**			3.306**
			(0.030)			(0.025)
Small animal mortality [4.5-5.99%]			1.999*			2.696
			(0.084)			(0.261)
Small animal mortality [ $\geq 6\%$ ]			3.535***			8.049***
			(0.003)			(0.001)
Average herd size (log)	-4.747*	-5.277**	-3.830	7.082	3.914	7.718
	(0.082)	(0.036)	(0.140)	(0.331)	(0.550)	(0.256)
Total deposits (log)	0.086	0.091	0.163	-2.711	-2.749	-2.702
	(0.944)	(0.942)	(0.894)	(0.368)	(0.367)	(0.371)
Outstanding loans (log)	0.669	0.815	0.690	3.665**	3.906**	3.720**
	(0.363)	(0.275)	(0.344)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Herding households (log)	-5.534	-5.221	-5.657	-9.924	-9.026	-10.094
	(0.133)	(0.155)	(0.123)	(0.147)	(0.190)	(0.140)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.18	0.17	0.18
Number of districts	326	326	326	326	326	326
Observations	1,535	1,535	1,535	1,535	1,535	1,535

Notes: Estimates from OLS estimation with district and year fixed effects. The sample comprises an unbalanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016, containing only district-year observations with a positive number of insurance purchasers. P-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

**Table A3: Determinants of index insurance demand at the extensive and intensive margin in sample excluding districts that are province capitals.**

Dependent variable:	Share of households purchasing IBLI			Insured animals per herding household		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Small animal mortality	0.281** (0.045)			0.525** (0.050)		
Sheep or goat mortality exceeds threshold		2.509*** (0.004)			3.376** (0.036)	
Small animal mortality [1.5-2.99%]			0.580 (0.167)			1.640 (0.105)
Small animal mortality [3-4.49%]			2.047** (0.012)			3.630** (0.010)
Small animal mortality [4.5-5.99%]			1.869* (0.098)			2.212 (0.354)
Small animal mortality [ $\geq 6\%$ ]			3.328*** (0.004)			7.266*** (0.001)
Average herd size (log)			-3.983 (0.116)			6.626 (0.315)
Total deposits (log)			0.048 (0.968)			-1.735 (0.556)
Outstanding loans (log)			1.338 (0.105)			4.857** (0.025)
Herding households (log)			-12.157*** (0.006)			-19.136** (0.046)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.18	0.17	0.19
Number of districts	305	305	305	305	305	305
Observations	1,525	1,525	1,525	1,525	1,525	1,525

Notes: Estimates from OLS estimation with district and year fixed effects. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016 that are not province capitals. P-values based on robust standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).

**Table A4: Determinants of index insurance demand at the extensive and intensive margin with Conley Standard Errors.**

Dependent variable:	Share of households purchasing IBLI			Insured animals per herding household		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Small animal mortality	0.245*			0.615*		
	(0.080)			(0.051)		
Sheep or goat mortality exceeds threshold		2.198**			3.698**	
		(0.016)			(0.030)	
Small animal mortality [1.5-2.99%]			0.612			1.656*
			(0.169)			(0.086)
Small animal mortality [3-4.49%]			1.868**			3.436**
			(0.040)			(0.017)
Small animal mortality [4.5-5.99%]			2.133**			2.771
			(0.047)			(0.257)
Small animal mortality [ $\geq 6\%$ ]			3.307**			7.350***
			(0.012)			(0.006)
Average herd size (log)	-4.158	-4.729**	-3.389	6.811	3.710	7.327
	(0.103)	(0.048)	(0.161)	(0.304)	(0.541)	(0.253)
Total deposits (log)	0.244	0.295	0.331	-1.677	-1.632	-1.626
	(0.788)	(0.753)	(0.712)	(0.526)	(0.543)	(0.531)
Outstanding loans (log)	0.739	0.847	0.767	3.600**	3.751**	3.654**
	(0.220)	(0.171)	(0.194)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Herding households (log)	-6.161**	-5.938**	-6.402**	-10.500**	-9.875*	-11.058**
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.031)
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province linear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.18	0.18	0.18
Number of districts	326	326	326	326	326	326
Observations	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630	1,630

Notes: Estimates from OLS estimation with district and year fixed effects. The sample comprises a balanced panel of districts across Mongolia between 2012 and 2016. P-values based on Conley standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Source: Mongolian Statistical Information Service (2022).