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Bargaining over an uncertain outcome:¶the role of beliefs

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Abstract.

We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that the solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them “more distant” from the other agent's beliefs makes the second agent better off.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CERAS-ENPC, Université Paris II and Institut Universitaire de France¶e-mail: billot@u-paris2.fr, , , , , , FR

    Antoine Billot

  2. CERMSEM, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne¶e-mail: chateaun@univ-paris1.fr, , , , , , FR

    Alain Chateauneuf

  3. Eitan Berglas School of Economics and Recanati School of Business¶e-mail: igilboa@post.tau.ac.il, , , , , , IL

    Itzhak Gilboa

  4. EUREQua, CNRS, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne and Università di Venezia¶e-mail: jmtallon@univ-paris1.fr, , , , , , FR

    Jean-Marc Tallon

Authors
  1. Antoine Billot
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  2. Alain Chateauneuf
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  3. Itzhak Gilboa
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  4. Jean-Marc Tallon
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Additional information

Received: 10 May 2001 / Accepted: 22 August 2001

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Billot, A., Chateauneuf, A., Gilboa, I. et al. Bargaining over an uncertain outcome:¶the role of beliefs. DEF 25, 33–45 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s102030200002

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s102030200002

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