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TERRORISM, DEMOCRATIZATION
AND SECURITY SECTOR
REFORM IN INDONESIA

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Introduction

The tragedy of September 11 in the United States and other terrorist attacks in many regions of the world, including in Indonesia have increased the significance of security sector reform in general and in Indonesia in particular. This is mainly due to the fact that terrorist acts were attacks on freedom and civilization—as part of a widening and deepening of the concept of security—in the whole world. The globalization of terror and the resultant fear of it has forced nation-states to re-conceptualize and to strengthen its (national) security.¹

In line with a growing body of literature on national security studies and democratic peace², the efforts of any democratic country to provide security to its people was guided by the conviction that the quality of security provided by the state depends on the ability of states to organize its security apparatus along democratic lines in a security sector reform initiative. On the other hand, civil society actors also play an important role in helping to manage and oversight the security sector.

More specifically, security sector reform (SSR) is primarily concerned with the establishment of appropriate structures for (democratic) civilian control. The other key elements of SSR, as Timothy Edmunds argued, are the process of the civilianisation of security sector bureaucracies and the de-politicisation of the security sector³. The arguments above clearly imply that the role of the civilians as part of “wider security family”⁴ is quite crucial in the development of democratic security forces and the process of SSR.

This paper attempts to link the issue of terrorism as a threat to security and the importance of SSR in Indonesia. It is divided into several sections. The first section describes the need to promote democratization in combating terrorism. The next part of the paper delineates the impact of terrorism on security sector reform as part of democratization. Lastly, the paper discusses what lessons Indonesia’s civilians and military can learn from it.

*Will democracy discourage terrorism?*⁵

It is, of course, not an easy task to answer the above question satisfactorily. Although cynics may grow, democratization, to a large extent, has gained momentum as a counterterrorism strategy in the post September 11 attacks. The logic behind this strategy is that the democratic procedures and institutions can help to address the underlying roots of terrorism.

The causes and roots of terrorism as a trans-national threat⁶ are multifaceted and complex, and any single respond, namely military respond, will only create new problems. Terrorism attacks the values of respect for human rights, the rule of law, tolerance among peoples and

1 See Sean Kay (2004). Globalization, Power and Security. In Security Dialogue. Vol.35. No.1.pp.9-26.

2 See for example, Tarak Barkawi, Mark Laffey (1999). The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization. In European Journal of International Relations. Vol.5. No.4.pp.403-434.

3 See Edmunds, Timothy (2001). Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation. Report for Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces.p.6.

4 See Fitz-Gerald, Ann (2003). Security Sector Reform-Streamlining National Military Forces to Respond to the Wider Security Needs. In Journal of Security Sector Management. Vo.1.No.1 (March).

5 There are a lot of definitions of terrorism. In this writing, I borrow definition of terrorism from David J Whittaker (2001). The Terrorism Reader. London:Routledge.p.5. According to Whittaker, the term terrorism should at least five different elements that relate to each other. (1) terrorism “is eluctably political in aims and objectives”, (2) “violence act or threatens violence, (3) “designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions beyond immediate victim or target, (4) “conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain or command or conspiratorial cell structure, (5) “perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity”.

6 Transnational threat can be defined as “...threats that do not respect national borders and which often arise from non-state actors, such terrorists and criminal organizations...”. See A National Security Strategy for A New Century, Washington: The White House, December 1999.p.2.

the peaceful resolution of conflict. In doing so, terrorism can endanger freedom and justice which then become a serious threat to democracy. Thus, a comprehensive and dynamic policy respond rather than a coercive measure is more than necessary. This comprehensive policy should incorporate of activities that attack both symptoms and causes of terrorism. Koffi Anan, UN Secretary General, argued that:

"We should all be clear that there is no trade-off between effective action against terrorism and the protection of human rights. On the contrary, I believe that in the long term we shall find that human rights, along with democracy and social justice, are one of the best prophylactics against terrorism".⁷

The lack of democracy has played a role, however, in producing the conditions conducive to the emergence of terrorist movements. Karin von Hippel, a senior research fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London, even argued that the real breeding grounds for terrorism are strong authoritarian states that lack of democracy and accountability.⁸ While former Secretary of State, Colin Powell has noted that "A Shortage of economic opportunities is a ticket to despair. Combined with rigid political systems, it is a dangerous brew indeed".⁹

Nation-states with authoritarian political systems, including military regimes, weak civil societies, nondependent media and economic difficulties create an environment in which terrorist groups can thrive. As Ray Takesh and Nikolas Gvosdev argued the weak and failed states have a number of attractions for terrorist organizations to grow.¹⁰ This is mainly due to the fact that: (1) failed states will provide the opportunity to acquire territory, (2) failed states have weak or non-existent law-enforcement capabilities, (3) they also create pools of recruits and supporters for terrorist groups, (4) they also retain the outward signs of sovereignty.¹¹ In the case of Indonesia, for example, the failure to respond to political reform and law enforcement was believed to lead to the emergence of new militant youngster and terrorists of the Radical Islamic movements. Consequently, the establishment of a more democratic political system and the enhancement of law-enforcement capability can be used as a 'soft tool' to mitigate the spread of terrorist movements.

Further, the policies of the establishment and the empowerment of democratic political systems in the long term involve different aspects, such as:¹²

- *Avenues for peaceful change of government.* By having regular, free, and fair elections, the public can bring about the change of leaders/governments peacefully;
- *Channels for dissent and political discussion.* A democratic regime can have better governance structure that can initiate the public debate on particular issues/policies;
- *Rule of law.* The principle of public accountability will be hold by the public and government;
- *Civil Society.* In democracies, civil society will play a significant role in controlling the political power of the executives;

7 Quoted from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/human_rights.html, accessed 10 March 2005.

8 Karil Von Hippel (2003). The Roots of Religious Extremist Terrorism. In <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/wsg/sept11/papers/root5.html>, accessed 19 March 2003.

9 Colin Powell, speech before the Heritage Foundation, Washington DC, 12 December 2002.

10 Ray Takesh, Nicholas Gvosdev (2002). Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home ? In The Washington Quarterly. Vol.25. No.3.pp.97-108.

11 Ibid.

12 See Jennifer Windsor (2003). Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism. In The Washington Quarterly. Vol.26. No.3, pp-43-58.

- *Free flow information.* Democracy also guarantees the free flow information. The public, then, will have access to competing sources of information;
- *Strong states.* Democracies tend to be better governed by the chosen person of their own people;
- *Sustainable economic and social development.* This aspect relates to the Human Development Report, produced by the UNDP, that democracy is essential to human development;
- *Needed values and ideals.* Democracy is based on certain ideals such as tolerance, compromise, respect for individual rights, equality of opportunities, and equal status under law. These values can be utilised to mitigate the fundamental roots of terrorism;

Nevertheless, promoting democratization in a country with limited tradition of democracy has certain political and security risks. However, series of terrorist attack in the last four years have served as a catalyst for a new era of democracy promotion all over the world. The significant trend on the linkage between democracy and terrorism is that many states which are in the transitional process are vulnerable to the terrorism activities. The continuing weakness of states will become a major liability in the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, democratic political culture and system will foster the civil liberties, rule of law, civil society and civilian control of the military, all of which are necessary to democracy in dealing with terrorism.¹³ As Rob de Wijk stated the fight against terrorism is actually the battle to win the hearts and minds of the whole societies.¹⁴

The significance of promoting democratization as an approach to the problem of international terrorism is recognized in the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism which argued that the fight against international terrorism is a long-term efforts to tackle broader economic, political and societal problems, such as: poverty, social disorder, lack of democracy, and poor governance.¹⁵ It is also emphasized by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). In its report "Mapping the Global Future 2020", NIC argued that the world should endorse further development of more open political system as one of counterterrorism approaches, particularly in the fragile democratic countries.¹⁶ It is mainly due to the fact that terrorism poses unique challenges to (liberal) democratic states.

Multilaterally, the UN as an international organization can also contribute critical efforts to the campaign against terrorism.¹⁷ First, the UN can enhance the legitimacy of state actions, including military actions. Second, it can also help to establish international norms and standards of accountability in parallel with the human rights. Third, the UN can share the economic burden of the war on terrorism and lastly, it can also give some assistance to share the political burden. Since the early 1990s, the UN Security Council (UNSC), for instance, has attempted to weaken State support for and strengthen State resistance to terrorism. The UN has, at least, released 12 (twelve) international conventions against terrorism and 8 (eight) Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing but many states are remain outside those normative foundations and not all countries ratifying the conventions and adopted those rec-

13 See Cindy R.Jebb (2004). Liberal Democracy versus Terrorism: The Fight for Legitimacy. In <http://www.isanet.org/archive/jebb/html>, accessed 14 Feb 2005.

14 See Rob de Wijk (2001). The Limits of Military Power. In The Washington Quarterly. Vol.25. No.1.pp.75-92.

15 See Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (2003). Combating Terrorism. In The Washington Quarterly. Vol.26. No.4.pp.163-176.

16 See National Intelligence Council (2005). Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence's Council 2020 Project.Washington.pp.93-100.

17 See Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (2003). *ibid*

ommendations.¹⁸ As a result, the capacity of the UNSC to assist states to fight against terrorism is limited to normative and technical supports.

The Importance of Security Sector Reform

The security sector reform, which was introduced in the 1990s, was relatively new concept to deal with the problems and challenges of new security environment. In today's international relations, threats to security is not only military in nature, but it also includes non-military threats such as trans-national organized crimes and terrorism. These new threats, of course, require that all state's security actors operate in a concerted manner. Further, the changing security environment also led to two important changes in the concept of security, namely: (1) from an exclusive focus on territorial security to a greater emphasis on human security, and (2) from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.¹⁹ As a result, a national security strategy should include all strands of the wider security sector and clearly articulate objectives and priorities of a more comprehensive national security interests.²⁰ In this context, the US-led 'war on terrorism' is particularly illustrative of the changing nature and respond of military security as well as the increasing 'securitisation' of non-military issues.

From a security perspective, the security sector reflects the broader notion of security. This is due to the fact that SSR does not only cover the military but it also acknowledges the significance role of the non-military actors in the provision of public security—internal and external. The main concern of the SSR, then, is the establishment of new institutions and delineating the powers of the security sector actor. It includes all "state institutions and agencies that have the legitimate authority to use force, to order force or to threaten the use of force in order to protect the state and its citizens".²¹ The main objective of SSR is "to create systemic accountability and transparency on the premise of increased, substantive and systematic democratic control".²² From this objective, we can have an understanding that SSR uses a holistic approach by recognising the significance of militarised formation other than the regular armed forces in civil-military reform efforts and recognising that the role of security and security sector actors in economic and political reform are important and complex.²³ While for many developing countries, SSR constitutes a major challenge to political transitions within the context of a democratization process. On the other hand, SSR can also be categorized as a part of military reform of the process of democratization (a democratic transition from the era of bureaucratic authoritarian regime).²⁴

SSR is about making the institutions that are responsible for protecting society more accountable to individual citizens and communities and more responsive to their security needs, while ensuring that they become more efficient and effective in providing security. It relies on

18 For further discussion on this issue, see UN (2004). *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. Report of the Secretary's-General High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York. Pp.47-51.

19 Dylan Hendrickson (1999). *A Review of Security Sector Reform*. Working Papers. London: Centre for Defence Studies, University of London. pp.17-18.

20 Ann M. Fitz Gerald (2003). *Security Sector Reform: Streamlining National Military Force to Respond to the Wider Security Needs*. In *Journal of Security Sector Management*. Vol.1.No.1. pp.1-21.

21 See Hans Born, Philipp Fluri (2003). *Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Democratic Oversight for Security Sector Reform*. Paper delivered at the International Civil Society Forum, Mongolia, September 8-9, 2003. pp.1-8.

22 Ibid.

23 See Timothy Edmunds (2001). *Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation*. Report for Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Pp.1-14.

24 For further discussion on this issue, see for example David J. Galbreath (2004). *Democratisation and Inter-State War: Why Reform does not Encourage Conflict*. In *Politics*. Vol.24. No.3. pp.206-214.

making information about the security sector actor, policies, and practices widely available to the public. In this sense, it deals with the systematic efforts to achieve the good and democratic governance. As Professor Robin Luckham of Sussex University, describes SSR as:

“...the quintessential governance issue. This is so both in the sense that there is enormous potential for the misallocation of resources and also because security sector out of control can have an enormous impact on governance—indeed, be a source of malgovernance.”²⁵

In this context, democratic governance is the core of SSR activities. However, improving the the democratic governance of the security sector is a societal challenge that requires reformers (military, parliaments and civilians) to take into account the specific cultural, political and institutional conditions of a nation-state. Thus, from a governance perspective, the security sector should be subject to the principles of good governance such as accountability, transparency, and democratic participation. A document published in 2000 by the UK Department for International Development has attempted to defines some basic principles in the SSR, which can be summarized as follows.²⁶

First, the security sector actors are accountable and their operations are overseen by elected civil authorities and various civil society organizations. The second principle is that the security sector actors should be operated in accordance with international and domestic law. The next principles is the availability of any information about the planning, budgeting and operations of the security sector’s actors should be easily accessed by the wider public and a comprehensive and disciplined approach to the management of all resources is adopted. Fourth, the legislative (parliament) and executive branches of civil authorities have the capacity to exercise political control over the policies, budgets, and operations of the security sector actors. In line with this, the civil society should also have the capacity to oversee, monitor and constructively participate in the political debates concerning those policies, budgets and operations. Fifth, the civil-military relations are based on a well-articulated hierarchy and the respect for human rights. And lastly, individuals are guaranteed due legal process and equal treatment in a fair and transparent manner.

Consequently, SSR is a long-term developmental programme which requires the transformation of state-structures, operating procedures, legal provisions, and even cultural traditions. It is an integrated component of the state’s overall governance system and structure. It can not be measured in a short time, but it will take years. However, SSR should be initiated in new democracies. Otherwise, the state will not become the source for providing security for its citizens and communities, particularly when it has to dealing with the new threats to security, but is part of the security problem.

Lessons to be learnt

The process of security sector reform in Indonesia initially started after the fall of President Soeharto in May 1998. The problem of SSR becomes even more complex when one has to consider the domestic economic and political context in Indonesia since the end of 1997. The other crucial factor that need to be take into account is the international environment when the world faced serious threat of terrorism in the post September 11, 2001. To put it another way, the reform of security sector should take into account the rapidly changing security context in any particular country.

25 Quoted from Ann M. Fitz Gerald (2003). Security Sector Reform: Streamlining National Military Force to Respond to the Wider Security Needs. In Journal of Security Sector Management. Vol.1.No.1.pp.4.

26 UK Department for International Development (2000). Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditures. London.

However, the global war on terrorism, to a large extent, has also propelled the rigorous debate on security sector reform, particularly on the civil freedom and liberties worldwide. The heavily emphasis on military operation to curb terrorism has caused great concern among Indonesian pro-democracy scholars, activists and NGOs that the military will continue to act with impunity.²⁷ This concern comes from a question whether the US campaign on war against terrorism is going to become a war against democracy.

Even though national security is the concern of the whole public, the national security policy paper as reflected on the Indonesia's defence white paper still reflects the domination of military views and interests on defence issues, particularly on the fight against terrorism.²⁸ The paper stated that:

"Threats from terrorism need urgent actions and the TNI is directly concerned to have a role and function in fighting terrorism in accordance with the spectrum of threats".²⁹

As the *Jakarta Post* argued in its editorial, this comes as no surprise considering that although the Department of Defence may be led by a civilian, those running the show, including those who drafted the white paper, come from the TNI³⁰.

Many civilians argued that this is still a weakness in Indonesia, particularly the lack of knowledge of military strategy and defence management of the civilians in the national security policymaking process. The other weaknesses of the civilians in this process were strategic and policy constraints³¹ which had limited the substantial role of the civil society in policy making and controlling the policy. Despite of these constraints, the first thing that Indonesian civilians should have is more awareness of the defence knowledge and needs in order to be more involved in the debate on security related issues. As has been argued by Timothy Edmunds, the effective and wide engagement of civil society in security sector issues is quite crucial due to the societal legitimating to the security sector in a democratic context.³²

While Laurie Nathan argued the obstacles to security sector reform in emerging democracies are many and varied.³³ He mentioned that there at least five major obstacles in the implementation of SSR, such as the problem of complexity which deals with a large number of agendas and policies that may have to be transformed simultaneously; the problem of expertise that relates to the lack of expertise of political decision makers and member of parliaments on the issues pertinent to security and defence; the problem of capacity relates to the limited capacity of a competent and fair judiciary, police service and criminal justice system; the problem of resistance to change refers to the political reluctant of the military and political decision makers to the political transformation due to both ideological and political reasons; the problem of insecurity relates to the unstable conditions (exclusion of minorities from governance, socio-economic deprivation combined with unequal distribution of wealth and power, and weak states that are unable to manage societal conflict) that many countries has experienced which produced authoritarianism and militarisation. The above conditions then gave to a security vacuum that the state, civil society groups and individuals seek to fill through the use of violence.

27 Riefqi Muna (2004). Security Reform. In Inside Indonesia, January-March.

28 The official name of the policy paper is "Defending the Country Entering the 21st Century, published by Indonesia's Department of Defence (2003).

29 Ibid.p.51.

30 See the Jakarta Post, April 15, 2003.

31 For further discussion on these issues, see Sukma, Rizal, Prasetyono, Edi (2003). Security Sector Refom in Indonesia:The Military and Police. Working Paper no. 9. Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael".

32 Timothy Edmunds (2001).p.8.

33 See Laurie Nathan (2004). Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New Democracies. In Journal of Security Sector Management. Vol.2 No.3.pp.1-7.

Further, the white paper also still contained some controversial issues.³⁴ The first most controversial issue is the need for TNI to play a leading role in maintaining domestic security along with the national police (Polri). This issue reflects that the government attempted to mix and even blur the distinction between defence and security. While we have to pay attention that terrorism can not be fought by using military forces only.

The paper also, for example, stated that while Indonesia does not have any immediate military external threats, it does have non conventional threats ranging from terrorism, drug trafficking, separatist movement, illegal fishing, illicit human trafficking and so on which could ultimately jeopardize the national security. The government will use any necessary policies and instruments to reduce any potential threats to Indonesia. Yet, any measures to be taken to mitigate any potential threats should not violate the basic human rights and democratic values.

The other controversial point of the paper is the TNI's need to maintain its presence among the people through its huge network of territorial commands. Yet we know that from the previous experience, particularly during the New Order regime, the presence of the territorial structure all the way down to the village level has created the impression of a heavily militarized nation. The other experience of the military commands was that through this territorial system, TNI has continued to exercise its political influence, even though the concept of *Dwi-fungsi* (dual function)³⁵ is legally no longer in politics. Even though, the dual function has been replaced by the new paradigm in which removed the TNI from its direct role in political affairs—given up its political seats in the parliament--and shifted the TNI's focus toward external defence and the preservation of national unity in 1998, the internal reform have neither significantly diminished the political influence of the territorial chains nor erased the involvement of the TNI in domestic affairs and foreign relations.

Ironically, the paper also seeks to put an end to the debate about TNI's current territorial system by stating that those calling for its abolition are denying the fact that TNI and the people are one and can not be separated³⁶. To put it another way, TNI has still consistently perceived itself to be the guardian of national unity, development and cohesion. To borrow the words of Takashi Shiraishi, it reflects "TNI's self-image as the irreplaceable backbone of the nation".³⁷

The above points, as some Indonesian civilian expert on military affairs argued, was counterproductive to one goals of reform, which is to demilitarize the nation as Indonesia march toward a strong civil society. Further, this point will also disrupt a healthy civil-military relations which require the premise that military should obey the civilian control³⁸. Many commentators on Indonesian military frequently emphasized that if true democracy is to succeed in Indonesia, it will not be enough for the TNI to professionalize but also to accept a position truly subservient to the state.³⁹

However, the international environment/international community also play a significant role in the process of SSR in Indonesia. As Rizal Sukma and Edy Prasetyono argued that there are two roles international community can play in assisting SSR in Indonesia.⁴⁰ First, interna-

34 Anak Agung Banyu Perwita (2004). Security Sector Reform: The Case of Indonesia. In Journal of Security Sector Management. Vol.2. No.4.pp.1-9.

35 With this concept, the military (TNI) has enabled to serve its socio-political function and to have an institutionalized role in the government.

36 Anak Agung Banyu Perwita (2003). Memahami Buku Putih Pertahanan RI 2003 [Understanding Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2003], KOMPAS, 26 May.

37 As quoted from John Bradford (2005). The Indonesian Military As A professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for Reform. Working Papers no.73. Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies. p. 9.

38 This argument was the result of several discussions on TNI's reform in series of workshops in Jakarta organized by Indonesia's Working Group on Security Sector Reform-Pro Patria in which the writer was also a member.

39 See John Bradford (2005).p.23.

40 Rizal Sukma, Edy Prasetyono (2003). Security Sector Reform in Indonesia' The Military and the Police. Working paper no.9. Den Haag: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'.pp.33-34

tional community can help to raise the awareness of the significance of SSR and the need for an objective civilian control of the military. Second, it can also help to provide financial and technical assistance to the security sector institutions, such as training and education programmes for the military and cooperation in areas of common interests in fighting terrorism.

The US resumption of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program to Indonesia, which has been stated by Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State, was a clear example of the role of international actor in assisting the SSR process in Indonesia. The US decision to resume military education and training members of TNI was also a clear indicator that the US needs a broadened military cooperation with Indonesia to curb international terrorism.⁴¹ The George W. Bush administration has repeatedly stressed the importance of broadening post September 11 counterterrorism cooperation with Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim nation, in dealing with terrorism.⁴²

The government, of course, welcomes this US policy shift to build a stronger tie with Indonesia in the global fight against terrorism by saying Indonesia will be able to carry out (military) reforms within the framework of democracy. The TNI also welcomed it as a positive move of the US's foreign and defence policy toward Indonesia. While Indonesia's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Marty Natalegawa stated that "... the resumption of the program represents an acknowledgment of the far-reaching democratic changes that have taken place in Indonesia in recent years".⁴³ Many analysts saw the US decision to resume its military assistance to train Indonesia's military officers after a 14 years of suspension of cooperation as the US' recognition of Indonesian government's efforts to reform the security sector, particularly the TNI.⁴⁴

On the other hand, human rights activists saw this as a setback for justice, human rights and democratic reform. John Miller, spokesman for the New York-based East Timor Action Network, argued that the US policy shift to Indonesia was a betrayal of their quests for justice and accountability.⁴⁵ This reaction is actually not really surprising mainly because the SSR process in Indonesia is not really going smoothly due to the various colliding interests of security sector institutions in Indonesia. Indeed, as has been pointed out by Rizal Sukma and Edy Prasetyono, the success of security sector reform in Indonesia will be based on the strong triangular initiative and relations of civil society, the international community and the military and police themselves.

Concluding remarks

As has been discussed above, the state/government response to terrorism can range from defeat or coercion to accommodation, directed at the individual or (militant) groups of people. Even though Indonesia is now experiencing internal reform, the above discussion shows that the fighting against terrorism as stated in the Defence White Paper is still the product of a political system in which the state (military) was stronger than the society. During the New Order period, national security policy issues were used as a powerful instrument by which the state could mitigate the role of civil society. More important, the making and the conduct of national security policy reflected the core values of the state, internal order and political stability. The indiscriminate use of force, for instance, will not only be counterproductive for fighting against terrorism but will also endanger the process of democratization.

The limited role and the low capacity of the wider (civilian) society were also shown in the policy making process of the national security policy, particularly the White Paper. As has

41 See "US plans to resume military training", The Jakarta Post, 28 February 2005.

42 Ibid.

43 See "IMET resumption seen as recognition of TNI reform", The Jakarta Post, 1 March 2005.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

been argued above, it comes as no surprise considering the lack of political will of the military, the civilians' lack of knowledge on security affairs and more importantly, the domination of the TNI military views and interests to security related issues such as the war on terrorism. More importantly, TNI should have also a stronger political will in involving wider society in the making of security policies, including policies in fighting terrorism.

However, the white paper provides a rare glimpse into the thinking of the member of the society who is in charge of national security. The globalizations of democratic institutions have forced many developing countries, including Indonesia to initiate the implementation of SSR. Of course, SSR is not the end of democratization but it is rather a process that needs to be controlled not only by the state but by all elements of society toward a more democratic society. The significant lessons that we could learn from this glimpse is quite disturbing for the pace of internal reform and for our march toward democracy and a stronger civil society. As a result, Indonesia has still a long way to go in implementing a more effective SSR and becoming a more democratic country.

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