Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection

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serval:BIB_DFC5AD5B8705
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Publication sub-type
Minutes: analyse of a published work.
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Publications
Institution
Title
Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection
Journal
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Author(s)
Grassi S., Ma C.-T. A.
ISSN
1467-9779
1097-3923
Publication state
Published
Issued date
02/2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
14
Pages
1-34
Language
english
Abstract
We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means-test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost-effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their costbenefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost-effectiveness equilibrium than the means-test equilibrium.
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10/07/2016 12:00
Last modification date
21/08/2019 6:10
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