Les Neurosciences au Tribunal: de la responsabilité à la dangerosité
Details
State: Public
Version: After imprimatur
License: Not specified
Serval ID
serval:BIB_17F02F5CEABF
Type
PhD thesis: a PhD thesis.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Les Neurosciences au Tribunal: de la responsabilité à la dangerosité
Director(s)
Gasser J.
Institution details
Université de Lausanne, Faculté de biologie et médecine
Publication state
Accepted
Issued date
08/2015
Genre
Thèse de doctorat
Language
french
Number of pages
171
Notes
Au cours des dernières années, une explosion d'intérêt pour les neurosciences a conduit au développement du « Neuro-droit », un nouveau champ de savoirs pluridisciplinaire consacré à l'examen de l'impact et du rôle des découvertes neuroscientifiques dans la procédure judiciaire. De nouvelles techniques neuroscientifiques font leur apparition dans les tribunaux états-uniens et européens à travers les expertises psychiatriques, en suscitant des avis divergents. L'association des dysfonctionnements structuraux et/ou fonctionnels du cerveau à la manifestation de certains comportements déviants a ouvert la voie à l'utilisation des neurosciences dans le cadre des expertises pénales et de la psychiatrie légale, dont la tâche principale consiste à l'évaluation de la responsabilité et de la dangerosité (risque de récidive) d'un prévenu. Dans un premier temps, nous examinons l'apport des neurosciences, de par les nouveaux outils générés, à la question centrale, qui est celle de la responsabilité pénale. Une recherche jurisprudentielle amène à constater les difficultés et limitations importantes de l'utilisation des neurosciences pour l'évaluation de la responsabilité pénale d'un prévenu, alors que le climat sécuritaire actuel et la politique de gestion des risques des sociétés contemporaines placent la question de la dangerosité des prévenus au centre des préoccupations. Dans une deuxième partie, la thèse se concentre sur l'impact des neurosciences sur l'évaluation de la dangerosité pénale. Nous examinons la façon dont les travaux et techniques neuroscientifiques pourraient être instrumentalisés afin de répondre à des attentes sociétales sécuritaires, dans le but de débattre des enjeux éthiques émergeants. L'utilisation des neurosciences dans les expertises psychiatriques pénales implique un questionnement et des réserves éthiques afin de prendre en considération la pluralité de leurs effets sur le devenir pénal des sujets. Les preuves neuroscientifiques dans les tribunaux peuvent s'avérer "ambivalentes" pour les personnes expertisées : bien que les recherches et techniques neuroscientifiques introduites lors d'un procès pénal via l'expertise psychiatrique conduisent généralement à la conclusion d'une responsabilité réduite, ces mêmes données pourront être interprétées par les magistrats comme signe de dangerosité et conduire à des sanctions et/ ou des mesures (dans les droits de tradition romano-civiliste) de longue durée, fondées sur l'hypothèse d'une forte probabilité de récidive des sujets présentant des dysfonctionnements cérébraux. À travers le renforcement d'une conception utilitariste de la peine, remettant en question l'existence du libre arbitre, les neurosciences accentuent la tendance actuelle des politiques pénales à se focaliser sur la dangerosité. Par ailleurs, elles favorisent le retour à une approche médicale du crime, susceptible de donner lieu à des interventions « thérapeutiques » prématurées et ambigües. Les erreurs et les pièges épistémiques des courants criminologiques passés, visant à expliquer la manifestation d'un comportement violent et déviant sur la base d'éléments biologiques et déterministes, rappellent la nécessité d'être vigilants concernant l'utilisation des méthodes neuroscientifiques modernes dans les procédures pénales.
Abstract
In recent years, an explosion of interest in neuroscience has led to the development of "Neuro-law," a new multidisciplinary field of knowledge whose aim is to examine the impact and role of neuroscientific findings in legal proceedings. Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in US and European courts in criminal trials, as part of psychiatric testimony, nourishing the debate about the legal implications of brain research in psychiatric-legal settings. During these proceedings, the role of forensic psychiatrists is crucial. In most criminal justice systems, their mission consists in accomplishing two basic tasks: assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender and evaluating their future dangerousness.
In the first part of our research, we aim to examine the impact of Neuroscientific evidence in the assessment of criminal responsibility, a key concept of law. An initial jurisprudential research leads to conclude that there are significant difficulties and limitations in using neuroscience for the assessment of criminal responsibility.
In the current socio-legal context, responsibility assessments are progressively being weakened, whereas dangerousness assessments gain increasing importance in the field of forensic psychiatry.
In the second part of our research we concentrate on the impact of using neuroscience for the assessment of dangerousness. We argue that in the current policy era of zero tolerance, judges, confronted with the pressure to ensure public security, may tend to interpret neuroscientific knowledge and data as an objective and reliable way of evaluating one's dangerousness and risk of reoffending, rather than their responsibility. This tendency could be encouraged by a utilitarian approach to punishment, advanced by some recent neuroscientific research which puts into question the existence of free will and responsibility and argues for a rejection of the retributive theory of punishment.
Although this shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favor of a consequentialist approach to criminal law is advanced by some authors as a more progressive and humane approach, we believe that it could lead to the instrumentalisation of neuroscience in the interest of public safety, which can run against the proper exercise of justice and civil liberties of the offenders.
By advancing a criminal law regime animated by the consequentialist aim of avoiding social harms through rehabilitation, neuroscience promotes a return to a therapeutical approach to crime which can have serious impact on the kind and the length of sentences imposed on the offenders; if neuroscientific data are interpreted as evidence of dangerousness, rather than responsibility, it is highly likely that judges impose heavier sentences, or/and security measures (in civil law systems), which can be indeterminate in length. Errors and epistemic traps of past criminological movements trying to explain the manifestation of a violent and deviant behavior on a biological and deterministic basis stress the need for caution concerning the use of modern neuroscientific methods in criminal proceedings.
In the first part of our research, we aim to examine the impact of Neuroscientific evidence in the assessment of criminal responsibility, a key concept of law. An initial jurisprudential research leads to conclude that there are significant difficulties and limitations in using neuroscience for the assessment of criminal responsibility.
In the current socio-legal context, responsibility assessments are progressively being weakened, whereas dangerousness assessments gain increasing importance in the field of forensic psychiatry.
In the second part of our research we concentrate on the impact of using neuroscience for the assessment of dangerousness. We argue that in the current policy era of zero tolerance, judges, confronted with the pressure to ensure public security, may tend to interpret neuroscientific knowledge and data as an objective and reliable way of evaluating one's dangerousness and risk of reoffending, rather than their responsibility. This tendency could be encouraged by a utilitarian approach to punishment, advanced by some recent neuroscientific research which puts into question the existence of free will and responsibility and argues for a rejection of the retributive theory of punishment.
Although this shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favor of a consequentialist approach to criminal law is advanced by some authors as a more progressive and humane approach, we believe that it could lead to the instrumentalisation of neuroscience in the interest of public safety, which can run against the proper exercise of justice and civil liberties of the offenders.
By advancing a criminal law regime animated by the consequentialist aim of avoiding social harms through rehabilitation, neuroscience promotes a return to a therapeutical approach to crime which can have serious impact on the kind and the length of sentences imposed on the offenders; if neuroscientific data are interpreted as evidence of dangerousness, rather than responsibility, it is highly likely that judges impose heavier sentences, or/and security measures (in civil law systems), which can be indeterminate in length. Errors and epistemic traps of past criminological movements trying to explain the manifestation of a violent and deviant behavior on a biological and deterministic basis stress the need for caution concerning the use of modern neuroscientific methods in criminal proceedings.
Keywords
Neurosciences, Droit, Psychiatrie, Expertise
Create date
30/11/2015 13:32
Last modification date
14/03/2024 8:09
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