Socially induced false memories in the absence of misinformation

Ample evidence shows that post-encoding misinformation from others can induce false memories. Here, we demonstrate in two experiments a new, tacit form of socially generated false memories, resulting from interpersonal co-monitoring at encoding without communication of misinformation. Pairs of parti...

Verfasser: Wagner, Ullrich
Schlechter, Pascal
Echterhoff, Gerald
FB/Einrichtung:FB 07: Psychologie und Sportwissenschaft
Dokumenttypen:Artikel
Medientypen:Text
Erscheinungsdatum:2022
Publikation in MIAMI:18.09.2023
Datum der letzten Änderung:18.09.2023
Angaben zur Ausgabe:[Electronic ed.]
Quelle:Scientific Reports 12 (2022), 7725, 1-8
Schlagwörter:Human behaviour; Psychology
Fachgebiet (DDC):150: Psychologie
Lizenz:CC BY 4.0
Sprache:English
Förderung:Finanziert über die DEAL-Vereinbarung mit Wiley 2019-2022.
Förderer: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft / Projektnummer: 324469518
Förderer: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft / Projektnummer: 397530566
Format:PDF-Dokument
URN:urn:nbn:de:hbz:6-99908607717
Weitere Identifikatoren:DOI: 10.17879/29918506378
Permalink:https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:6-99908607717
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    Ample evidence shows that post-encoding misinformation from others can induce false memories. Here, we demonstrate in two experiments a new, tacit form of socially generated false memories, resulting from interpersonal co-monitoring at encoding without communication of misinformation. Pairs of participants jointly viewed semantically coherent word lists, presented successively in blue, green, or red letters. Each individual was instructed to memorize words presented in one of the colors. One color remained unassigned (control condition). Participants (total N = 113) reported more false memories for non-presented words (lures) semantically related to partner-assigned than to control lists, although both list types were equally irrelevant to their own task. Notably, this effect also persisted for particularly rich memories. These findings show for the first time that social induction of false memories, even subjectively rich ones, does not necessarily require communication of deceptive information. This has important implications both theoretically and practically (e.g., in forensic contexts).