Five years ago, Adam Tooze’s comprehensive study of the Nazi economy found a vast and predominantly favorable resonance in the media and the historiographical communities of the anglophone and German-speaking worlds. There are indeed many merits to Tooze’s study that deserve to be emphasized. But there are also some atsonishing deficiencies and shortcomings. The gravest is Tooze’s failure to offer any argument whatsoever on the widening rift between the corporate business community and the cadres of the political-military institutions. The growing distance between the two preceded the terminal stage of the Nazi dictatorship, which began in the last quarter of 1943. If Tooze had addressed the well-established facts on this issue, he would likely not have been able to conclude on such an affirmative note and insist on the transatlantic happy end that supposedly put paid to the German elites’ adventures between 1931 and 1948.