Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation

Herrmann, Michael

Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation

Dateien

Herrmann_0-370878.pdfGröße: 515.01 KBDownloads: 303

Datum

2008

Autor:innen

Herrmann, Michael

Schriftenreihe

SFB 504 Discussion Paper

URI (zitierfähiger Link)

http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-370878

Link zur Lizenz

Urheberrechtlich geschützt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

In this paper, I suggest that voters may act strategically in proportional representation elections with post-election coalition building. Based on a stylized setup involving three possible coalitions of four parties on a single policy dimension, voters whose preferred coalition is least likely to win are predicted to strategically cast their ballot for a centrist party. By contrast, those who perceive a chance for their preferred coalition to become the next government are predicted to strategically vote for a non-centrist party. I test these predictions against the standard model of sincere proximity voting, using a unique dataset on voter expectations in the Austrian parliamentary election 2006. Analyses show that believing one’s preferred coalition is non-viable raises the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party while believing one’s preferred coalition to be viable lowers the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Zitieren

ISO 690

HERRMANN, Michael, 2008. Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation

BibTex

@techreport{Herrmann2008Expec-35839,
  year={2008},
  series={SFB 504 Discussion Paper},
  title={Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation},
  number={08-28},
  author={Herrmann, Michael}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Nein