Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box : The Relevance of Expressive Voting

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Version: Final published version
Serval ID
serval:BIB_11F88D6CE74A
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Fiscal Federalism at the Ballot Box : The Relevance of Expressive Voting
Journal
Review of Law and Economics
Author(s)
Jones P., Soguel N.
ISSN
1555-5879
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2010
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
6
Number
3
Pages
469-488
Language
english
Abstract
This paper explores the impact of citizens' motivation to vote on the pattern of fiscal federalism. If the only concern of instrumental citizens was outcome they would have little incentive to vote because the probability that a single vote might change an electoral outcome is usually minuscule. If voters turn out in large numbers to derive intrinsic value from action, how will these voters choose when considering the role local jurisdictions should play? The first section of the paper assesses the weight that expressive voters attach to an instrumental evaluation of alternative outcomes. Predictions are tested with reference to case study analysis of the way Swiss voters assessed the role their local jurisdiction should play. The relevance of this analysis is also assessed with reference to the choice that voters express when considering other local issues. Textbook analysis of fiscal federalism is premised on the assumption that voters register choice just as 'consumers' reveal demand for services in a market, but how robust is this analogy.
Open Access
Yes
Create date
17/07/2014 13:56
Last modification date
20/08/2019 12:39
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